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The explosion of new pollution control legislation in the last
few years is a familiar phenomenon. As an intimate participant in
the Illinois branch of this experience, I have published a pair of
articles attempting to analyze the Illinois program from the in-
side.1 This article is a preliminary tour of the pollution laws of
other states. My hope is to expose general patterns of pollution
control legislation, to offer comparative judgments, and to uncover
new ideas. No pretense is made that one can adequately evaluate a
pollution control program by the statutes alone. The true test lies
in the performance of the administering agency. Unfortunately, the
sheer size of the task precludes an investigation of agency practice
in each of the fifty states. But while a sound statutory framework
is no guarantee of a vigorous, reasonable program, it is an indis-
pensable prerequisite. A study of the statutes alone may therefore
be a useful first step toward understanding how well the states are
doing.
The efforts to control both air and water pollution are increas-
ingly dominated by federal statutes.2 Inadequate state authority
thus does not necessarily ensure that there will be too much pollu-
tion. State efforts remain important, however. In the first place,
the federal laws are not comprehensive. They are patchworks deal-
ing with certain prominent problems, and in the areas they leave
unregulated, state law is indispensable. Moreover, the federal pro-
grams attempting to alleviate air and water pollution rely heavily
on state participation, through state plans for implementing fed-
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eral air quality standards' and state administration of the national
pollutant discharge elimination system ("NPDES") for water pol-
lution control.4
This investigation is focused on laws concerned with air and
water pollution. The analysis seeks to highlight important features
on a functional basis, without attempting to describe the details of
each state's program.
I. INTRODUCTION: THE ORIGINS OF ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION
The central principles governing pollution control are easily
stated. If we do too little to prevent pollution, we may wipe our-
selves out; if we do too much, we may go back to the Dark Ages.5
Translating these postulates into a real-life program, however, is a
formidable task for the social architect, and the source of acute
controversy.
A. The Market
Much travail (including this article) could be avoided if that
deity of economists, The Market, could be counted on to control
pollution. But even the faithful acknowledge that it cannot be. The
difficulty is that much of the harm done by a polluter falls upon
others. In his rational self-interest, the polluter may be willing to
destroy an entire county to make an extra dime. He would not do
so if the victim offered him twenty cents to stop, but in the real
world the victim cannot always make the offer. In the typical pol-
lution case, the harm is suffered not by one but by thousands. The
costs of transacting with so many people will in some cases be high
enough that the bargain to maximize society's wealth by reducing
pollution will not be made.6 Thus, concludes the economist, if the
law does not intervene there will be too much pollution.7
3 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (Supp. 1 1978).
4 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1976 & Supp. 1 1978).
5 For introductory surveys of the sources, effects, and cures of air pollution, see COUN-
CIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QuALrrY, ENvmoNMENTAL QUALITY 61-91 (1970); Note, Air Pollution:
Causes, Sources and Abatement, 1968 WASH. U.L.Q. 205. For much more detailed informa-
tion, see Am PoLLuToN (3d ed. A. Stern 1977).
6 Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1, 15-16 (1960).
7 There is another argument that also holds appeal for economists. In the arid western
states, the traditional law of water rights, which vaguely entitled each landowner to "reason-
able" use of the stream, was replaced by a rule granting the first taker a permanent right to
use the water. The rationale was that some protection against losing the water to later users
was necessary to encourage investment in the irrigation works indispensable to western de-
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B. Private Remedies
Travail would also be reduced if we could leave- the problem to
private lawsuits brought against polluters by their victims. Such
suits have long been permitted, and they serve useful purposes; but
they cannot suffice. We can guard against possible economic ineffi-
ciency in such actions by refusing to enjoin pollution that produces
net social benefits and by requiring victims to take steps to mini-
mize their losses.9 We can do away by statute0 with artificial limi-
tations on the right of injured people to sue." We can counter the
reluctance of pollution victims to incur large litigation costs by the
prospect of fat attorney's fees in a class action. Yet the ultimate
inadequacy of the best private law was writ large by a class action
filed not long ago on behalf of seven million residents of the Los
Angeles area against 1,293 defendants, most of them unknown and
unnamed, asking a court to do something to improve the air.'2 The
court quite properly threw its hands up and the suit out. The be-
lief that a lawsuit is the best way to determine not only the opti-
velopment. See Moyer v. Preston, 6 Wyo. 308, 318-19, 44 P. 845, 847 (1896). The same
considerations suggest the desirability of some legal assurance that expenditures to put land
to beneficial use will not be rendered vain by subsequent pollution.
We have come this far without mentioning the argument that government should take
action against pollution because it is wrong. Professor Coase has admonished us that one
landowner injures another by preventing him from running a polluting business. Coase,
supra note 6, at 2. It is likewise true that the prohibition of punching noses limits liberty,
but many would find a moral basis for the philosopher's conclusion that freedom to extend
the arm ends at the next person's nose. There are difficulties in distinguishing "mine" from
"thine" when every action affects one's neighbor, but logic seems unlikely to overcome the
widely shared view that one who throws "too much" filth upon his neighbors has done them
wrong. See Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J.
LEGAL STUD. 49 (1979). See also J. Esposrro, VANISHING Am (1970). How much is too much
is of course the crucial question.
8 See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312
(1970) (semble).
I Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 108 Ariz. 178, 494 P.2d 700 (1972), is
illustrative of this general approach.
10 E.g., MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. §§ 691.1201-.1207 (Supp. 1980). See Sax & Conner,
Michigan's Environmental Protection Act of 1970: A Progress Report, 70 MICH. L. Rv.
1003 (1972).
1 E.g., Bouquet v. Hackensack Water Co., 90 N.J.L. 203, 101 A. 379 (1917) (riparian
landowner could not maintain a public nuisance action because his injury was not shown to
be different from that suffered by the public in general).
1" Diamond v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. App. 3d 374, 97 Cal. Rptr. 639 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1971). For additional discussion of the difficulties of private actions to redress pollu-
tion, see Hines, Nor Any Drop to Drink: Public Regulation of Water Quality (pt. 1), 52
IOWA L. REv. 186, 196-201 (1966).
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mum pollution level in Los Angeles, but also who should take what
steps to achieve it, is a pipe dream.
C. Emission Charges
A favorite refuge of those seeking to avoid the horrors of bu-
reaucratic regulation is to make polluters consider the true costs of
their actions by imposing emission charges taxing them in the
amount of the harm they do to others."3 The argument is attrac-
tive. Not only will the rational polluter stop polluting before caus-
ing a net harm to society; 14 taxation also serves our sense of fair-
ness by requiring payment for using public resources-the air or
the water-as a receptacle for private wastes.
The difficulty of determining the level at which emission taxes
or charges should be set, however, has precluded their widespread
use. In order to achieve optimal pollution control, the charge
should reflect the cost of the damage done by each unit of a con-
taminant emitted. Quantifying pollution damage even in the gross
has proved problematic for economists, however.15 The problem is
exacerbated by the fact that the damage done by any given unit of
contamination varies widely according to a host of factors. A stated
quantity of sulfur dioxide, for example, may do no detectable harm
at all if emitted in an area where there are no other emissions; yet
when it is added to existing discharges of the same pollutant in a
heavily contaminated area, it could mean the difference between
life and death. Moreover, the identical quantity discharged may
have a more acute effect on air quality, and thus do more damage,
if emitted at ground level rather than through a high stack, or dur-
ing calm rather than windy weather, or in a confined river valley
rather than on a plain. The same quantity of hydrocarbon emis-
sions may cause a more serious oxidant problem in Denver than in
Minneapolis because of the higher altitude and greater prevalence
of sunlight. Identical sulfur dioxide emissions may be more harm-
ful in the presence of high particulate concentrations. Further,
even the same levels of ambient air quality may do more harm in
13 See, e.g., A. KNEmSE & B. BowER, MANAGING WATER QUALrrY: EcONOMICS, TECHNOL-
OGY, INSTITnTONS 97-179, 237-53, 315-18 (1968).
14 The rational polluter will pay the emission charge only so long as it is less than the
cost of abating the pollution. Thus, whenever the cost of abatement is less than the damage
done by pollution, the rational polluter will not pollute.
18 See Ridker, Strategies for Measuring the Cost of Air Pollution, in THE ECONOmiCS
OF Am POLLUON 87 (H. Wolozin ed. 1966).
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New York City, where there are many people and much valuable
property, than in an uninhabited desert. Pollution will do more
harm to the elderly and ill than to healthy young adults, and least
of all to those who take precautions against it.26
Given these uncertainties, any tax that is set would probably
be highly arbitrary, and the likelihood that it would result in any-
thing resembling an optimal degree of control is slim. Most legisla-
tive bodies have therefore understandably placed primary reliance
on subjective but candid efforts to determine optimal levels of pol-
lution by direct governmental prescription.
That we would have too much pollution without regulation or
taxes, and that accurate taxation may be impracticable, does not
prove that we should regulate. The costs of administration are an
ever-present constraint upon the thoroughness of regulatory per-
formance, and it is theoretically possible that such costs could ex-
ceed the benefits of reduced pollution.17 Given the vast potential
for pollution damage, however, and the economic certainty of ex-
cessive damage in the absence of substantial government interven-
tion, it is not to be expected that society will back off from its
conclusion that regulation, despite its imperfections, is on balance
likely to do more good than harm.
D. Public Nuisance
The decision that regulation is needed takes us only to the
threshold of a myriad of refractory problems. What governmental
institutions should be set up to deal with pollution?
The traditional, almost knee-jerk response of our legal system
to the perception that government should act is to make something
a crime. We began doing this long ago in response to the problem
of pollution. Both the common law and supplementary statutes
typically make air or water pollution a public nuisance,' which the
courts can either penalize or order abated upon suit by the ordi-
nary public prosecutor.19 There is utility in such provisions: with-
out the mounting procedural difficulties associated with class ac-
16 See generally J. Esposrro, supra note 7, at 9-19.
17 See Coase, supra note 6, at 18.
18 See W. PROSSmR, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTs 583-91 (4th ed. 1971).
1' For instance, a 1969 Illinois statute, based upon the perceived need to supplement
the work of indolent regulatory agencies, gave such powers to the state attorney general. ILL.
REv. STAT. ch. 14, 1 12 (1979).
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tions,2° they make it practicable to bring to book the large polluter
whose devastations are too scattered to justify a private suit.
To doubt the adequacy of public-nuisance law, however, one
need only recall the private suit described above, seeking to rem-
edy air pollution in Los Angeles. 21 When the pollution problem re-
sults from the interaction of a multitude of sources, it is fantasy to
suppose that substitution of the public prosecutor for the citizen
plaintiff makes a court an appropriate forum. In addition, the
highly technical information base necessary to the intelligent reso-
lution of many pollution problems argues for the creation of a sep-
arate, expert staff. Moreover, in order to avoid shutting down civi-
lization, a public nuisance law must leave it to the court to decide
in each particular case whether the offending activity causes exces-
sive harm in light of its utility. The resultant vagueness of the
standard is a formidable deterrent to voluntary compliance. If one
cannot be sure what the law requires until after a lawsuit, one may
very well postpone large pollution control expenditures, either in
the hope that they may be found unnecessary or for fear that they
may be wasted if one has underestimated the requirements and is
forced to start over.
E. Administrative Agencies
Considerations such as these have induced American govern-
ments to turn to separate administrative bodies invested with au-
thority over pollution control, and, as will appear below, to entrust
those administrators with rulemaking and adjudicative as well as
with prosecutorial functions. State and local agencies slumbered
quietly, on the whole, for many years. Around 1970, however, wide-
spread public dissatisfaction with past control efforts triggered a
wave of new and more vigorous environmental legislation. One re-
sult was the body of state statutes to which we now turn.
20 See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) (plaintiff must bear cost
of individual notice to each class member); Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291
(1973) (even when some class members satisfy federal minimum jurisdictional amount, no
ancillary jurisdiction over other members with separate claims who do not); Snyder v. Har-
ris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969) (no aggregation of class members' separate claims to satisfy amount
requirement).
21 See text and note at note 12 supra.
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II. RULEMAKING
A. Delegation and its Limits
One prominent defect of the public-nuisance law, as I have
suggested, was its lack of prior warning to the polluter as to which
preventive measures were required. Not surprisingly, one virtually
universal feature of modern state pollution laws is their focus upon
the development of detailed, specific standards prescribing the lim-
its of permissible pollution for various contaminants and sources.
In devising these standards, the technical complexity of the
problem argues for specialization. It would be possible in theory to
leave rulemaking to the legislature, as in such other highly detailed
fields as income taxation and traffic control." But legislators are
busy generalists whose responsibility is to make the big political
decisions; as the reality is that the details of a specific pollution
code would be largely determined by a technical staff anyway, the
nearly universal decision has been, as in many other complex fields
such as railroad ratemaking,23 aircraft safety,' and occupational
health,' 5 to join power with responsibility and to seek a more pro-
fessional product by eliminating the pretense of legislative
adoption.26
1. Maine: Legislative Adoption. Maine provides an interest-
ing exception to the prevailing pattern. The basic provisions ap-
" E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 , If 11-100 to -1507.1 (1979).
2S 49 U.S.C. §§ 10701-10786 (Special Pamphlet 1979).
2 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1976 & Supp. I 1977).
29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976 & Supp. 1 1978).
' See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 , 1 1010 (1979). At one time the doctrine that
legislative power was vested in Congress and state legislatures and could not be delegated
presented serious obstacles to administrative rulemaking. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). The nondelegation doctrine reflects, among
other things, a constitutional policy of preserving direct popular control of lawmaking. See
Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 22 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S.
546, 626 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting). The doctrine has yielded so far to the practicalities
of modern government, however, that delegation of rulemaking authority will generally be
upheld, at least if the legislature has laid down intelligible general principles to govern the
exercise of the delegated power. See, e.g., Federal Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc.,
426 U.S. 548 (1976). The old view still surfaces from time to time in the state courts. See,
e.g., Lincoln Dairy Co. v. Finigan, 170 Neb. 777, 104 N.W.2d 227 (1960); State v. Richmond,
36 Ohio Misc. 55, 302 N.E.2d 605, 606 (Mun. Ct. 1973) (holding that environmental protec-
tion director's discretionary authority to adopt regulations "imposes on the people of this
sovereign state a government by one man"), rev'd sub nom. State v. Acme Scrap Iron &
Metal, 49 Ohio App. 2d 371, 361 N.E.2d 250 (1974). In most states, however, the courts have
given short shrift to delegation attacks on the pollution law. Illinois is one example. See
Currie, Rulemaking, supra note 1, at 460-61.
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pear traditional enough. The Board of Environmental Protection is
directed to "exercis[e] the police power of the State, to control,
abate and prevent" both air and water pollution. 7 To accomplish
this task, the board is empowered to "adopt, amend and repeal
reasonable rules and regulations necessary for the proper adminis-
tration and interpretation of any provision of law that the depart-
ment is charged with the duty of administering"; rules duly
promulgated "shall have the full force and effect of the law."'28
Other sections, however, reveal that many of the Board's most im-
portant regulations, such as air quality and emission standards, re-
main in effect only "until 90 days after the adjournment of the
next regular or special session of the legislature,"2 unless enacted
into statute. In other words, rules of these types are to be adopted
by the legislature itself, not by the Board.
This is carrying mistrust of the bureaucracy to extremes. As a
result the statute books in Maine are cluttered with technical de-
tails, such as a standard limiting sulfur dioxide emissions from sul-
fite pulping processes to "40 pounds per air dried ton of sulfite
pulp produced"30 and five pages of water quality classifications
governing the Little Androscoggin River system.$1 Correspond-
ingly, there are almost no substantive regulations.3 2 For the legisla-
ture to concern itself seriously with such technicalities would take
more time than it could afford and would risk serious misunder-
standing of technical issues. On the other hand, if the legislature
acts as a rubber stamp either for recommendations from the
Board, or for politically powerful interests, legislative responsibil-
ity is a hollow pretense.
In fact the Maine statutes, despite legislative jealousy of the
rulemaking power, delegate enormous discretion to the Board. Li-
27 ME. Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 361 (West 1978).
- Id. § 343.
29 E.g., id. § 584 (West Supp. 1980) (ambient air quality standards). Formerly, the
agency could promulgate water classifications, although they were valid only until 90 days
after adjournment of the legislature if not enacted into statute. Id. § 367 (West 1978). In
1979 this authority was repealed. Now the agency may only recommend classifications to the
legislature. Id. (West Supp. 1980).
30 Id. § 604(2) (West 1978).
21 Id. § 368.
22 The only substantive regulations contained in ENV. REP., STATE WATER LAWS (BNA)
796:0502-03 (1979), limit discharges of phosphorus and heat. These were adopted during a
brief period when the Board enjoyed real rulemaking power, and their present validity
seems highly questionable. The only air pollution regulations are procedural. See ENv. RaP.,
STATE Am LAws (BNA) 396:0581 (1979).
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censing programs are established for sources of both air and water
pollutants. Among the conditions for issuance of a license is em-
ployment of "the best practicable treatment," which the Board
must essentially define for each license.33 Thus the Board appar-
ently can avoid the necessity for legislative approval of emission
standards by determining them on a case-by-case basis in process-
ing particular permit applications.
The disadvantages of lawmaking by adjudication were well de-
scribed by the Federal Trade Commission in its famous opinion
justifying the rule requiring health warnings on cigarette pack-
ages.3 In adjudication, issues affecting an entire industry are re-
solved without affording all those affected the opportunity to be
heard. Voluntary compliance is discouraged, as under the public-
nuisance doctrine, by the uncertainty of the law. Conduct under-
taken in good faith may be penalized if it is later found unlawful.
The same issues of practicability or harm may have to be litigated
over and over again. Even the Maine legislature, by its vague defi-
nition of "best practicable treatment," has acknowledged its in-
ability to cope with all the details of a pollution program. It should
thus allow the administering agency to express its exercise of dis-
cretion through the useful tool of rulemaking.
2. Michigan: Approval by Legislative Committee. The Mich-
igan legislature apparently mistrusts administrative rulemaking
nearly as much as Maine does. Michigan's Water Resources Com-
mission is authorized, among other things, to "establish such pollu-
tion standards for . . . waters of the state . . . as it shall deem
necessary,"3 5 and its Air Pollution Control Commission is empow-
ered to "establish standards for ambient air quality and emis-
sions."3 " Under Michigan's Administrative Procedures Act, how-
ever, no permanent regulation becomes effective without the
explicit approval of a committee composed of members of each
house of the legislature or the passage by both houses of an ap-
33 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 414-A(1)(D) (West Supp. 1979) (water); id. § 582(5-A)
(West 1978) (air); id. § 590 (West Supp. 1979) (air). The statutes broadly define "best prac-
ticable treatment" as the treatment method that "controls or reduces emissions. . . to the
lowest possible level," id. § 582(5-A) (West 1978), or is "best calculated to protect and im-
prove" water quality, id. § 414-A(1)(D) (West Supp. 1979), in both cases "consider[ing] the
... existing state of technology, the effectiveness of the available alternatives ... and...
economic feasibility," id. § 582(5)(A) (West 1978).
" FTC, Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of Cigarettes, 29 Fed. Reg.
8324, 8366-68 (1964).
SMICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 323.5 (1975).
- Id. § 336.15(a).
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proving resolution.37 In addition, regulations must be approved as
to form by the legislative service bureau and as to legality by the
attorney general.3 8 The absence of any corresponding criteria for
appraisal by the legislature or its joint committee implies that
those bodies are to conduct a free-wheeling reexamination of the
merits of proposed rules.
Any legislature that delegates rulemaking power to an admin-
istrative agency retains the right to overturn the actions of its dele-
gate by enacting legislation. Thus there is nothing inimical to the
principle of delegated power in a requirement that regulations be
filed with the legislature, with a view to possible corrective legisla-
tion.3 9 Michigan, however, goes far beyond this. In requiring af-
firmative legislative approval of individual regulations, it flies in
the face of the principal reason for the delegation of rulemaking
power: the impracticability of thorough legislative consideration of
technical and time-consuming detail.
3. Ohio: Legislative Veto. Ohio authorizes administrative
adoption of a broad spectrum of regulations including water quali-
ty standards"0 and rules "for the prevention, control, and abate-
ment of air pollution.' ' 1 But the Ohio Administrative Procedure
Act provides that the legislature may invalidate any regulation by
concurrent resolution, and that no regulation is effective for sixty
days pending legislative review.42
In theory the grounds for legislative disapproval are limited. A
joint committee is to recommend rejections only if the regulation
exceeds "statutory authority," "conflicts with another rule," or
"conflicts with the legislative intent in enacting the statute" under
which the rule is proposed.3 Yet the statutory authority to fight
pollution is broadly phrased: disagreement with the conclusion
- Id. §§ 24.245, 24.235 (Supp. 1980). There is an exception for temporary "emergency"
measures, but only if the Governor certifies the existence of the emergency. Even then, the
regulation may be rescinded by concurrent resolution without the opportunity for guberna-
torial veto that characterizes the normal legislative process. Id. § 24.248.
Id. § 24.245(1).
3' Washington does this. See WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 34.04.045 (West Supp. 1980); id.
§ 34.04.160 (1965). See also CAL. WATR CODE § 13141 (West Supp. 1979) (water quality
control plans not effective until reported to legislature); MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 8-1404
(Supp. 1979) (annual reports to the legislature and Governor required).
40 OHIo Rzv. CODE ANN. § 6111.041 (Page 1977).
41 Id. § 3704.03(E) (Page Supp. 1980).
4 Id. § 119.03(I). The only exception is if a gubernatorial certification of emergency
exists, in which case the regulation is effective, but for only 90 days. Id. § 119.03(F).
43 Id. § 119.03(I)(1)-(3).
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that a particular level of water quality is necessary to "protect[ ]
the public health and welfare, ' 44 for example, can easily be stated
as an argument that the agency has exceeded its authority or mis-
read "legislative intent." In effect, it seems that there can be reso-
lutions disapproving a regulation on the basis of the merits of 'an
agency determination.
Ohio is not so restrictive as Maine or Michigan; regulations
can become law without affirmative legislative action, and waiting
periods for legislative repeal are not exceptional. 5 What is unusual
about the Ohio statutes is that a concurrent resolution is substi-
tuted for legislation in the process of disapproval, apparently cir-
cumventing the governor's power of veto. Provisions of this kind
have come under serious criticism on grounds both of constitution-
ality and of policy."0 For purposes of this article, their principal
significance is that a legislative veto reduces the power of delegated
administrative lawmaking by making legislative reversal of regula-
tions easier than it would be in the normal legislative process.
B. The Scope of Rulemaking Powers
Those legislatures that are willing to delegate rulemaking au-
thority take varying approaches to the problem. Some rely on (at
least ostensibly) broad grants of general rulemaking authority;
others couple such a grant with lists of specifically authorized
types of rules; and some prefer to confine the agency's powers to
particularized areas.
1. General Rulemaking Authority. A number of state stat-
utes contain broad grants of general rulemaking authority over
pollution.47 One of the most sweeping is found in Kentucky, which
authorizes its Department of Natural Resources and Environmen-
44 Id. § 6111.041 (Page 1977).
" Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976) (90-day waiting period for effectiveness of federal rules of
civil procedure promulgated by the Supreme Court).
44 See, e.g., Bruff & Gellhorn, Congressional Control of Administrative Regulation: A
Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 HRv. L. REv. 1369, 1373-75, 1378-81 (1977). Legislative
vetoes may unconstitutionally evade the executive veto and invade the judicial prerogatives
of statutory construction and review. They also may cause delay in rulemaking, add to the
legislative workload, frustrate the procedural checks on rulemaking by opening the process
to political horse trading, and complicate the interpretation of statutory intent by requiring
courts to decide whether legislative inaction constitutes implicit ratification.
'7 For example, New Mexico provides for administrative adoption of "regulations to
prevent or abate water pollution," N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-6-4(D) (1979). Similar provisions in
Alaska, ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.020(10)(A) (Supp. 1979), and Mississippi, MIsS. CODE ANN.
§ 49-17-17(b), (i) (Supp. 1979), apply to both air and water.
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tal Protection, with the consent of the State Environmental Qual-
ity Commission, to promulgate "any rule or regulation pertaining
to the prevention, abatement, and control of existing or threatened
air or water pollution, disposal of waste, control of noise, or the use
of air, land, or water resources, or strip mining and reclamation."48
Such statutes provide maximum flexibility, permitting administra-
tors to utilize whatever form of regulation may prove most appro-
priate to deal with an unpredictable variety of problems.
A common variant of this broad authority is illustrated by
Delaware and Connecticut statutes respectively empowering an ad-
ministrator to adopt regulations "to effectuate the policy and pur-
poses of this chapter"4 9 and "to carry out his functions, powers and
duties."' 10 The breadth of such a rulemaking grant depends upon
the breadth of the "policy and purposes" or "functions, powers,
and duties" described elsewhere in the statute. The Delaware pro-
visions are typically comprehensive in this respect, including "con-
trol of pollution of the land, water, underwater and air resources
... to protect the public health, safety and welfare" 51 among the
duties of the pollution control agency. The Connecticut statute is
equally broad, directing the agency to "provide for the prevention
and abatement of all water, land and air pollution. '5 2
All of the foregoing examples, however, confer authority essen-
tially to prevent "pollution." The scope of any such rulemaking
power may thus be limited by a narrow definition of "pollution."
These definitions also affect the breadth of statutory prohibitions
against causing "pollution"; they are examined in a later section."
48 KY. REV. STAT. § 224.045(6)(b) (Supp. 1978); see id. § 224.033(17).
49 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6010(a) (1975 & Supp. 1978).
5 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-6(1) (1977). This language, standing alone, may be sub-
ject to a crippling interpretation; past decisions have held that similar clauses confer no
substantive power. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Federal Power Comn'n, 483 F.2d 1238,
1254-57 (D.C. Cir. 1973); New England Power Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 467 F.2d 425,
430 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (clauses of "implementary rather than substantive character ...
merely augment existing powers conferred upon the agency by Congress, they do not confer
independent authority to act" (footnote omitted)), aff'd, 415 U.S. 345 (1974). But see Na-
tional Petroleum Refiners As'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 678 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (authority to
promulgate "rules and regulations [for the purpose of carrying out a section of the Trade
Commission Act] should be construed to permit the Commission to promulgate binding sub-
stantive rules as well as rules of procedure"). The Connecticut statute, however, precludes
such an interpretation by explicit reference to both "environmental standards" and "proce-
dural regulations." CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-5(e) (1977).
51 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6001(c)(2) (1975).
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-5(e) (1977).
5' See Part H infra.
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In some states, moreover, an ostensibly broad grant of
rulemaking power is cut back by specific statutory limitations.
New Mexico, for example, limits its general grant of rulemaking
authority by a provision that no regulation may "specify the
method to be used" to avoid pollution.5 This restriction appears
to be motivated by legitimate desires to avoid monopolies and to
induce dischargers to seek efficient control methods. Unfortu-
nately, it seems to make it impossible to prescribe work practices
to minimize pollution when absolute limitations on the amount of
emissions are impracticable, as in the control of asbestos in the
demolition of buildings.5 5 Ohio, more significantly, appends to an
otherwise general grant of rulemaking power the words "prescrib-
ing... emission standards for air contaminants, and other neces-
sary regulations for the purpose of achieving and maintaining com-
pliance with ambient air quality standards." 6 Perhaps it is only
"other necessary regulations" that are limited to achieving ambient
standards, but a comma is a weak reed in statutory construction.
Even at best, the only permissible regulations independent of air
quality are "emission standards."
It is common to embellish general rulemaking grants with lists
of specific types of regulations intended to be included, such as
explicit authorization for "standard[s] of performance for new
sources, '57 or "standards of quality of the air and water."58 One of
the most extensive lists is found in Nevada, which supplements a
general authority with express references to "air quality stan-
dards," "emission control requirements," "fuel standards," and
"elimination of devices or practices which cannot be reasonably al-
lowed without generation of undue amounts of air contami-
nants. ' '5 9 The evident purpose of such additions is to guard against
the risk that a court might hold the general rulemaking authority
less all-inclusive than it appears. Specification in turn creates the
risk that a court may invoke maxims such as inclusio unius est
exclusio alterius or ejusdem generis to cut down the scope of the
general grant, and of course it is impossible for a legislature to
foresee and to list every type of regulation that may prove useful.,0
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-6-4(D) (1979).
See 38 Fed. Reg. 8820, 8821 (1973).
OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 3704.03(E) (Page 1980).
17 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-6-4(D) (1979).
" MISS. CODE ANN. § 49-17-17(h) (Supp. 1979).
5, NEV. REV. STAT. § 445.461(1)-(2), (5), (8)-(9) (1979).
One example of the incompleteness of any such list is provided by Village of Lom-
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2. Specific Provisions. Some states, either by oversight or in
order to keep administrators under tighter control, avoid grants of
general rulemaking power and rely entirely upon lists specifying
the types of regulations that may be adopted. These lists typically
include air or water quality standards and emission or effluent
standards, and in some states they include nothing else."' The ob-
vious risk in such statutes is the omission of useful types of regula-
tions. For instance, even if the power to adopt ambient standards
implies implementing regulations directed toward dischargers,
there may be a place for discharge limitations not immediately re-
lated to ambient quality.6 2 Moreover, it is by no means clear that a
reference to "effiuent" or "emission" standards embraces limita-
tions on the composition of process materials (such as the familiar
limits on sulfur in fuels or phosphate in detergents), much less the
various traffic control measures commonly employed to combat ve-
bard v. Pollution Control Bd., 66 Ill. 2d 503, 363 N.E.2d 814 (1977). The Illinois Supreme
Court held that the power to adopt "regulations to promote the purposes of this Title,"
including control of water pollution, hLL. RaV. STAT. ch. 111/2, 1013(a) (1979), did not
include regulations requiring consolidation of sewage treatment facilities. While the court
purported to recognize that the statutory listing of permissible regulations was not exclu-
sive, it seems to have been heavily influenced by the absence of this specific type of regula-
tion from the list.
61 E.g., Indiana, which empowers its stream pollution control board only to determine
what constitutes polluted water and to restrict "the polluting content" of any discharges,
IND. CODE ANN. § 13-1-3-7 (Burns 1973); Georgia, where the only regulations authorized by
the water law are "effluent limitations" and "standards of water purity," GA. CODE ANN.
§ 17-505 (Supp. 1980); and Kansas, which lists "ambient air quality standards" and "emis-
sion control requirements," KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-3005(K), -3010 (Supp. 1979), as the only
permissible regulations under its air statute. The Kansas and Georgia statutes contain addi-
tional provisions that arguably take them out of the category we are now discussing. The
former authorizes "rules and regulations implementing and consistent with this act," id.
§ 65-3005(a), the latter those "necessary for the proper administration of this Chapter," GA.
CODE ANN. § 17-505(9) (Supp. 1980). But the bland wording of these general provisions and
the presence of separate provisions specifying ambient and discharge standards suggest that
the general language confers only procedural rulemaking authority and conveys no addi-
tional substantive powers. See note 50 supra.
6" See Currie, Rulemaking, supra note 1, at 457, 491-95. In some places there may be so
much clean air or water to dilute the discharge that ambient standards could be met with-
out treatment. Yet ambient standards must be met in the future as well as today. "We
cannot allow present emission sources to use up the entire assimilative capacity of the air
without robbing the future of the opportunity for growth." Emission Standards, 4 Ill. P.C.B.
298, 309 (1972). In addition, there may be significant benefits in keeping the air or water
cleaner than ambient standards. Ambient standards are based on incomplete knowledge and
represent the worst level of pollution we are willing to tolerate rather than the optimum
level. It may therefore be desirable to prevent areas now clear from deteriorating to the level
of the ambient standard. Also, certain geographical areas may call for more protection than
necessary to meet the ambient standards on account of special esthetic or recreational
values.
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hicle pollution. 3 Nor is it clear that work practice requirements
are authorized as part of a power to adopt "emission standards.""
There is an enormous variety of substantive regulations that
are specifically authorized by one state or another. There are
special provisions authorizing administrative regulation of motor
vehicles, e5 fluorocarbons,e6 grain drying,67 particulates from the
processing of agricultural products,6 8 forest burning," mercury
emissions,70 and the open burning of field or turf grass for seed
production 1 or for agricultural purposes in general.71 Other laws
specifically authorize regulation of coal mine leaching,73 the nutri-
ent or phosphate level in cleaning agents' the testing and use of
substances employed to clean up oil spills,/ and oil transfer, treat-
ment, and disposal. 6
A few states authorize the creation of permit systems by regu-
lation; in others, permit requirements are imposed directly by
statute.7
C. Criteria to Guide Rulemaking
Statutory guidance for administrative determination of pollu-
tion standards is often nebulously general. Often the legislature es-
sentially directs the agency to consider both the benefits and the
I
" For examples of such traffic control measures, see D. CURRIE, POLUMTON: CASES AND
M1TERxLs 363-79 (1975).
" See Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 179 (1978), in which the Court
found one work practice requirement, the wetting of asbestos prior to building demolition,
not to be an emission standard.
"5 ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-1771 to -1780 (Supp. 1979); NEY. REv. STAT. § 445.610-
.710 (1979). Both states provide for establishment of exhaust emission standards and inspec-
tion programs.
"M hcH. Com. LAws ANN. §§ 336.101-.107 (Supp. 1980).
47 MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 693(d) (1980).
TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4477-5, § 3.10(e) (Vernon 1976).
" WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 70.94.660, .670 (1975).
70 Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 144.421-.423 (West 1979).
71 OR. REv. STAT. §§ 468.450-.495 (1979); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.94.656 (1975).
7' CAL. HEALTH & SASETY CODE § 41850 (West 1979); COLO. REv. STAT. § 25-7-123(b)
(Supp. 1979).
7' PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 35.691.315, .760.1 (Purdon 1977); id. § 32.5116 (Purdon
Supp. 1980).
' MicH. Comp. LAws ANN. §§ 323.231-.236 (1975); IOWA CODE ANN. § 455B.32(4) (West
Supp. 1980). The Michigan statute authorizes regulations to limit these levels but the Iowa
statute only allows regulations designed to publicize them.
78 CAL. WATER CODE § 13169 (West 1971).
76 MD. NAT. RsS. CODE ANN. §§ 8-1406 to -1411, -1417 (1974 & Supp. 1979). These
provisions dominate the entire Maryland water pollution statute.
7 See text and notes at notes 214-242 infra.
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costs of pollution control and then to achieve a reasonable balance
between them. A typically unhelpful example is Wyoming's air pol-
lution formulation:
(b) In recommending such standards or requirements the
administrator shall:
(i) Consider all the facts and circumstances bearing
upon the reasonableness of the emissions involved,
including:
(A) The character and degree of injury to, or
interference with the health and physical well being
of the people, animals, wildlife and plant life;
(B) The social and economic value of the
source of pollution;
(C) The priority of location in the area
involved;
(D) The technical practicability and economic
reasonableness of reducing or eliminating the pollu-
tion; and
(E) The social welfare and aesthetic value.
(ii) Grant such time as he shall find to be reasonable
and necessary for owners and operators of air contami-
nant sources to comply with applicable standards or
requirements. 8
Other statutes instruct rulemakers to achieve standards necessary
to "a reasonable balance between total costs to the people and to
the economy, and the resultant benefits to the people";79 to "deal
with any matters deemed necessary and feasible for protecting the
environment or the health of the state";80 or "to maintain the pu-
rity of the air resource of the state, which shall be consistent with
protection of the public health and welfare and the public enjoy-
ment thereof, physical property and other resources, flora and
fauna, maximum employment and full industrial development of
the state."1
71 Wyo. STAT. § 35-11-202 (1977).
79 IOWA Con ANN. § 455B.35 (West Supp. 1980).
So IDHO CODE § 39-107(8) (Supp. 1980).
81 IND. CODE ANN. § 13-1-1-1 (Burns 1973) (optimistically stating the competing consid-
erations as absolutes); see id. § 13-1-1-4(3). See also S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-2-11
(1977) (water quality standards shall "protect the public health and welfare and the present
and prospective use of such waters for public water supplies, propagation of fish and aquatic
life and wildlife, recreational purposes and agricultural, industrial and other legitimate
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Some statutes give even less guidance. For example, in South
Dakota the only criteria limiting an agency in setting effluent stan-
dards are that they must "include as a minimum all categories for
which the federal government has set standards" and "be at least
as stringent" as the federal standards.8 2 Presumably the board is to
attempt to carry out in its regulations the state's general statutory
policy "to conserve the waters of the state and to protect, maintain
and improve the quality thereof" for a variety of named uses;83 the
explicit inclusion of "agricultural, industrial, . . . and other legiti-
mate uses" 84 ensures that the utility of water as a vehicle for waste
disposal will be given consideration. Rhode Island, probably the
extreme example of standardless delegation, simply authorizes
agency adoption of "standards of water quality" and "reasonable
rules and regulations for the prevention, control and abatement of
[water] pollution," without so much as a declaration of statutory
policy.8 5
Any of the above formulations obviously leaves a great deal to
the judgment of the agency. This latitude is consistent with the
initial legislative decision that the subject is too complex and tech-
nical to make close legislative scrutiny practicable.
Sometimes, however, the statutory requirements are more con-
fining. New Mexico, for example, authorizes "a standard of per-
formance for new sources which reflects the greatest degree of ef-
fluent reduction . . . achievable through application of the best
available demonstrated control technology, processes, operating
methods, or other alternatives." 6 New York prescribes that efflu-
ent limitations require at least "effective secondary treatment" of
all sanitary sewage before discharge.87 Maryland generally insists
that state and federal air quality standards be "identical" and that
emission standards be "no more restrictive than required to attain
and maintain the ambient air quality standards," except where
other federal standards are more stringent.8 8 Massachusetts re-
uses").
82 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34A-2-13 (1977). The agency must perform the usual
balancing act to set ambient standards, see id. § 34A-2-11, quoted in note 81 supra.
'3 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34A-2-1 (1977).
sId.
, R.I. GEN. LAws § 46-12-3 (1971).
"N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-6-4(D) (1979).
87 N.Y. ENvnI CONSERv. LAW § 17-0509 (McKinney Supp. 1979).
" MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 693(b)(3), (6) (Supp. 1979). On request of local authorities,
however, stricter standards may be set. Id. § 693(b)(2).
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quires its administration, in adopting initial amendments to its im-
plementation plan, to "postpone the achievement dates for the pri-
mary and secondary ambient air quality standards to the latest
dates permitted pursuant to federal law." '89
The dominant theme in all of these more explicit require-
ments, however, is to conform state standards to the federal. The
common insistence that state standards be no less exacting than
federal requirements" is a predictable response to the availability
of federal grants for agencies that qualify to help administer the
federal program.9 1 A state's willingness to be a party to enforcing
regulations it has not determined to be reasonable seems highly
questionable policy, yet a refusal to go along would leave the af-
fected polluter subject to federal enforcement and thus accomplish
little. More difficult to comprehend is the not infrequent com-
mand, as exemplified by the Massachusetts and Maryland statutes
just quoted, to be no more stringent than federal law. Federal re-
quirements may well be excessively demanding in some instances,
but there is no reason to expect that standards expressing a na-
tionwide minimum of pollution control will suffice for every case
and all extraordinary needs. It is bad enough that Congress all too
often forbids the states to adopt standards to protect their own
people;92 for a state voluntarily to abdicate its own responsibility
in this manner is to punish the people in a fit of pique.
D. Rulemaking Procedure
Most states require "public hearings" before the adoption of
substantive regulations. A typical statute provides for the promul-
gation of environmental standards "after proper study and after
conducting a public hearing upon due notice."9 3
In some states the hearing requirement is subject to excep-
tions or qualifications. Colorado requires hearings only in connec-
tion with some of the authorized regulations.94 In Kentucky hear-
ings are held before an advisory committee that summarizes public
89 MAsS. ANN. LAWS ch. 111, § 142(D) (Michie/Law. Co-op 1975).
90 E.g., S.D. CODIFID LAWS ANN. § 34A-2-13 (1977).
91 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1255, 1256, 1281 (1976); 42 U.S.C. § 7405 (Supp. II 1978).
92E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (Supp. IH 1978) (prohibiting state emission standards for
new motor vehicles). See Currie, Motor Vehicle Air Pollution: State Authority and Federal
Pre-Emption, 68 MICH. L. REv. 1083 (1970).
93 S.C. CODE § 48-1-60 (1977).
" COLo. REv. STAT. §§ 25-8-205, -402 (1974 & Supp. 1979), which requires hearings to
set water quality standards but not to promulgate other regulations.
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response for the agency that actually promulgates rules.9 5 In
Alaska, while public proceedings are open to all interested parties,
oral statements may be limited at the discretion of the
department."8
Other states weaken their hearing requirements by providing
for less than comprehensive notice to the public. In Nevada notice
of the required hearing must be published only if "the regulation
provides a standard of water quality or waste discharge," and then
only "in a newspaper of general circulation in the area to which the
standard... will apply. 97 If the commission does no more than
this, many interested people will have no notice at all. New York's
water law demands a somewhat more sincere effort to provide a
meaningful hearing, by requiring notice by mail to "such other per-
sons as the department has reason to believe may be affected by
the proposed standards."98
The Georgia and Kansas water pollution statutes contain no
provision for public participation in the adoption of regulations."
Fortunately, the omission is remedied by general statutes requiring
notice and a hearing before any state agency promulgates regula-
tions.100 Government in the dark comports poorly with the appear-
ance of government for the people, and it creates serious risks of
error. Whether oral statements of position really add enough to
justify their inefficiency may be doubtful,101 but at the least the
states ought to disseminate broadly both the terms of and the jus-
tification for a proposed regulation, and solicit written responses.102
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 224.045(6) (Baldwin Supp. 1978).
ALAsKA STAT. § 44.62.210 (1976).
NEV. REV. STAT. § 445.207 (1977).
• N.Y. ENvm. CONSERV. LAW § 17-0301(10)(b) (McKinney 1973).
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 17-501 to -530 (1971 & Supp. 1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-161 to
-771 (Supp. 1979).
100 GA. CODE ANN. § 3A-104 (Supp. 1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-421 (Supp. 1979).
101 Oral statements of position have symbolic value in giving citizens a sense of partici-
pation through the opportunity to speak to the rulemaker face to face. Such statements may
also satisfy the fear that a written statement may either not be read or not be given suffi-
cient attention. On the other hand, there is no assurance that the rulemaker will listen at
all, let alone more carefully than he would read a written submission. See Currie, Rulemak-
ing, supra note 1, at 469-73.
101 This procedure was used by the Environmental Protection Agency in promulgating
effluent limitation guidelines under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. The agency
characterized the process as "essential" to the promulgation of "sound" regulations. 38 Fed.
Reg. 21202 (1973). See Williams, "Hybrid Rulemaking" Under the Administrative Pr-oce-
dure Act: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 42 U. CHI. L. REv. 401, 448-51 (1975). See also
Currie, Rulemaking, supra note 1, at 469-73 (describing the procedures used by the Illinois
Pollution Control Board).
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III. NUISANCE PROVISIONS
The heart of any program for administrative control of pollu-
tion is a delegation of authority to adopt regulations defining ac-
ceptable contaminant levels and practices. But no administrator
will be able to foresee and to provide in advance for all possible
pollution problems. Many legislatures accordingly have also en-
acted provisions outlawing "pollution" generally. The Nebraska
Environmental Protection Act is representative:
It shall be unlawful for any person ... [t]o cause pollution of
any air, waters or land of the state or to place or cause to be
placed any wastes in a location where they are likely to cause
pollution of any air, waters or land of the state .... 103
In many states, however, pollution control programs lack a catch-
all provision of this kind."" Moreover, Montana and South Da-
kota, while purporting to outlaw all water pollution, define it as
contamination in excess of that permitted by the regulations.10 5
This approach wholly fails to meet the need to control discharges
that fall outside existing regulations. In some states, independent
public-nuisance statutes may help to fill the gap. 08 Alternatively,
it may be possible for the administering agency to promulgate a
general prohibition against "pollution" under a broad grant of
rulemaking authority.10 7 Determining the true scope of a general
ban on pollution thus requires a close examination of the terms
used to define the ban.
103 NES. REV. STAT. § 81-1506 (Supp. 1978).
104 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-770 to -971, -1700 to -1780 (1974 & Supp.
1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-3001 to -3023 (1972 & Supp. 1979); MICH. Coum. LAWS ANN.
§§ 336.11-.36 (1975 & Supp. 1979); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 115.01-.09, 116.01-.41 (West 1977 &
Supp. 1979); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 203.010-.195 (Vernon 1972 & Supp. 1980); MONT. REV.
CODES ANN. §§ 75-2-101 to -429 (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 445.131-.354, .401-.710 (1979);
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 74-1-1 to -10, 74-6-1-13 (1979); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 26-24-1 to -26
(1978) (air); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 551-572 (1973); VA. CODE §§ 10-17.9:1-.23 (1978 &
Supp. 1980).
105 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 34A-2-2(1), 34A-2-21 to -23 (1977); MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. §§ 75-5-103(5), -605 (1979).
'0" E.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-801 to -807 (1978).
107 This occurred with respect to noise pollution in Illinois, where the Pollution Control
Board promulgated its own general nuisance provision. See Currie, Rulemaking, supra note
1, at 463-64. Such action in reliance on the general rulemaking authority, however, is vulner-
able to the charge that the legislature, by refusing to enact a statutory nuisance provision,
has determined that the agency should proceed only by adopting specific numerical
regulations.
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A. The Interests Protected
Not all the existing statutory "pollution" prohibitions are
comprehensive. Nebraska, for instance, defines air pollution as
concentrations "injurious to human, plant, or animal life, or prop-
erty, or the conduct of business." 10 8 This formulation at least ar-
guably excludes mere interference with the quality of life.
More comprehensive, and fairly typical, are the following.
Connecticut defines air pollution as
the presence in the outdoor atmosphere of one or more air
pollutants or any combination thereof in such quantities and
of such characteristics and duration as to be, or be likely to
be, injurious to public welfare, to the health of human plant
or animal life, or to property, or as unreasonably to interfere
with the enjoyment of life and property.20 9
The Washington definition of water pollution is:
such contamination, or other alteration of the physical, chemi-
cal or biological properties, of any waters of the state, includ-
ing change in temperature, taste, color, turbidity, or odor of
the waters, or such discharge of any liquid, gaseous, solid, ra-
dioactive, or other substance into any waters of the state as
will or is likely to create a nuisance or render such waters
harmful, detrimental or injurious to the public health, safety
or welfare, or to domestic, commercial, industrial, agricultural,
recreational, or other legitimate beneficial uses, or to live-
stock, wild animals, birds, fish or other aquatic life.110
Both of these formulations appear sufficiently broad in terms
of the interests they protect. "Legitimate beneficial uses" and "the
enjoyment of life or property" appear to be all-embracing even
without the additional interests listed for good measure. Obviously,
however, the breadth of protection actually afforded by this type
of statute depends upon subsidiary definitions of terms such as
"pollutants" and "waters."
B. The Pollutants Included
Most states appear to define "pollutant" or "contaminant"
10 NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-1502(2) (1976).
l CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-505 (West 1977).
"o WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.48.020 (Supp. 1979).
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rather broadly. For example, Washington's references to "physical,
chemical or biological" alteration and to "any liquid, gaseous,
solid, radioactive, or other substance" seem to leave very little
room for accidental omission. Hawaii uses "substances" in its air
pollution definition, coupled with a list that is expressly not exclu-
sive: "smoke, charred paper, dust, soot, grime, carbon, noxious
acids, fumes, gases, odors, particulate matter, or any combination
of these."111
Some states go to great lengths in their desire to be inclusive.
The Georgia law, classifying "solid or liquid particulate matter,
dust, fumes, gas, mist, smoke, or vapor or any matter or substance
either physical, chemical, biological, radioactive. . . or any combi-
nation or [sic] any of the above" as air contaminants,112 seems a
needlessly obscure way to refer to anything solid, liquid, or gase-
ous. Ohio defines water pollution as "the placing of any sewage,
industrial waste, or other wastes in any waters of the state" and
then provides definitions of the key terms: "sewage" is any sub-
stance containing "discharge[s] from the bodies of human beings
or animals"; "industrial waste" comes from "any process of indus-
try, manufacture, trade, or business, or from the development,
processing or recovery of any natural resource"; "other wastes" are
"garbage, refuse, decayed wood, sawdust, shavings, bark, and other
wood debris, lime, sand, ashes, offal, night soil, oil, tar, coal dust,
or silt, [and] other substances that are not sewage or industrial
waste." ' The point of all this specification is unclear; the final
reference to "other substances" appears to make the rest
redundant.
Doubtful cases under general references to "substances" or to
"liquid, gaseous, and solid" matter include odors, radiation, and
thermal pollution. In some cases, special provision is made for
these problem areas.11 4 A court not disposed to sabotage the evi-
dently all-encompassing legislative intent, however, can easily rea-
son that odors are smelly molecules, that radiation is radioactive
particles, and that thermal pollution is usually the addition of hot
water. Amending the definition of pollutants to include a reference
to energy would help to avoid possible oversights.
m HAWAn REv. STAT. § 342-21 (1976).
' GA. CODE ANN. § 43-2704(l)(a) (Supp. 1979).
.. OHIO RE v. CODE ANN. § 6111.01 (Page 1977).
'" E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 13-1-3-16 (Burns 1973); MIss. CODE ANN. § 49-17-5(0 (Supp.
1979).
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Sometimes there are explicit omissions from the definition.
Some states exclude steam and water vapor,115 apparently ignoring
the possibility that manmade fog might interfere, for example,
with transportation. The "application of any materials to land for
agricultural purposes or run-off of such materials from such appli-
cation" and "[t]he excrement of domestic and farm animals defe-
cated on land or run-off therefrom into any waters of the state"11
are excepted from the Ohio definition.
C. The Resource Protected
Connecticut's reference to "the outdoor atmosphere111  is
fairly common; a number of states employ similar language to
avoid conflict with industrial hygiene and "Clean Indoor Air" stat-
utes."' "Air" and "atmosphere" are used interchangeably to de-
note the resource being protected. Either term appears to be suffi-
ciently inclusive.
The definitions of "waters" are more variable. Some are very
general, like the Louisiana statute, which includes "rivers, streams,
lakes, groundwaters, and all other water courses and waters within
the confines of the state, and all bordering waters and the Gulf of
Mexico." 1 " The definitions, however, may leave three critical ques-
tions unresolved: whether "waters" include those underground,
those privately owned, or those artificially created. Some statutes
explicitly include all three categories. 20 Others make express ex-
ceptions. Cooling reservoirs, sewers, and treatment plants are fre-
quently excluded,"2 for reasons that are obvious. One does not
wish to outlaw the cleaning of polluted water prior to its discharge.
215 E.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-24-2(1), (3) (1976); Wyo. STAT. § 35-11-103(b)(i) (1977).
n OHIO RED. CODE ANN. § 6111.04(C), (D) (Page Supp. 1979).
n, CONN. GEN. STAT ANN. § 19-505 (West 1977), quoted in text at note 109 supra.
1KB See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116.06(3) (West 1977) (defining "air pollution" as con-
tamination of "outdoor" air). See also id. §§ 144.411-.417 (West Supp. 1979) (Clean Indoor
Air Act).
"I LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:1093(5) (West Supp. 1980).
120 ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.900(22) (1977); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-1851(16) (Supp.
1979) (adding, apropos of the state's desert character, that waters "perennial or intermit-
tent" also are included); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-1902(9) (1976); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 25-
54(b) (West Supp. 1980); IDAHO CODE § 39-103(9) (Supp. 1980); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1111/2,
1 1003(o) (1979); IOWA CODE ANN. § 455B.30(9) (West Supp. 1979); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 115.01(9) (West 1977); NEB. REv. STAT. § 81-1502(21) (1976); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 1413.213(20) (1978); S.C. CODE § 48-1-10(2) (1977); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34A-2-2(6)
(1977).
1 COLO. REy. STAT. § 25-8-103(16) (1974); HAwAI REV. STAT. § 342-31 (1976); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 82, § 926.1(6) (West Supp. 1979); W. VA. CODE § 20-5A-2(e) (Supp. 1980).
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Another common exemption is for waters on private land that do
not "effect a junction with natural. . . waters,"12 2 especially where
there is a single owner. 2 The exclusion apparently is based on the
theory that in that case no one is hurt but the polluter himself.
Some states go even further, and exempt all privately owned
ponds,124 farm ponds, 25 or landlocked private surface waters.126
One danger in this type of exemption is that pollution of private
waters may affect public waters with which they connect, but a
properly worded prohibition on the pollution of public waters
might prevent that. A more important objection to any exclusion
of privately owned waters is that some states that have such ex-
emptions appear to make no effort to protect part-owners from
depredations by their fellows. 27
Artificial waters do not appear to have been specifically ex-
empted by any state, but statutes silent on the subject 28 are sus-
ceptible to narrow interpretation. Apart from the independent is-
sue of private ownership, there is no obvious reason to think there
is less need to protect the quality of artificial than of natural
waters.
The importance of protecting groundwater should be obvious,
and almost all states specifically include it in the definitions of
state waters. 2 e Some states even go so far as specifically to ban all
I" N.Y. ENviR. CONSERV. LAW § 17-0105(2) (McKinney 1973); accord, N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 61-28-02(6) (Supp. 1979); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 6111.01(H) (Page 1977); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 468.700(8) (1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 70-326(cc) (Supp. 1979). See also ME. RFv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 38, § 361-A(7) (1978) (language to same effect); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-6-2(G) (1977)
(same).
' FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.031(3) (West 1973); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-503(d) (Supp. 1979);
ME. RE V. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 361-A(7) (1978); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 204.016(15) (Vernon Supp.
1980) (excluding waters on private land owned by tenants in common); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 70-326(cc) (Supp. 1979). See also Wis. STAT. ANN. § 147.015(13) (West 1974) (excluding
waters owned by "a person"--a term defined by id. § 147.015(1) to include, inter alia, a
municipal corporation).
1"4 IND. CODE ANN. § 13-1-3-16 (Burns 1973).
'2, W. VA. CODE § 20-5A-2(e) (Supp. 1979).
116 MIss. CODE ANN. § 49-17-5(f) (Supp. 1979).
127 E.g., IND. CODE ANN. §§ 13-1-3-1 to -16 (Burns 1973).
118 E.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 25-8-103(16) (1974); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6002(7), (22)
(1975); HAWAn REV. STAT. § 342-31 (1976); IND. CODE ANN. § 13-1-3-16 (Burns 1973); ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 361-A(7) (West 1978); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 21, § 26A (Michie/
Law. Co-op Supp. 1980); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 204.016(15) (Vernon Supp. 1980); MONT. REv.
CODES ANN. § 75-5-103(9) (1979); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 149.1(V), (VII) (1978); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 74-6-2-(G) (1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 70-326(cc) (Supp. 1979); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
10, § 1251(7) (1973); VA. CODE § 62.1-10(a) (1973); Wyo. STAT. § 35-11-103(c)(vi) (1977).
129 E.g., CAL. WATER CODE § 13050 (West 1971); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-8-103 (1974);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.031 (West 1973); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 204.010 (Vernon 1972).
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pollution of either surface or ground waters, rather than banning
pollution of water generally and including ground waters within
the definition.130 These are wise precautions, because a definition
merely listing such terms as "rivers, lakes, and streams" would in-
vite the unfortunate invocation of ejusdem generis to exclude
groundwater. Rhode Island, to its serious detriment, flatly limits
its definition to surface waters.13
1
D. The Relevance of Cost, Intent, and Negligence
The Connecticut statute quoted above is typical in defining air
pollution as "unreasonabl[e]" interference with the enjoyment of
life and property.13 2 Such language should make it clear that the
prohibition is not absolute. Commendably, the cost of abatement is
to be balanced against the harm caused by contamination. Many
pollution provisions, however, are not so restrained. West Virginia,
for example, forbids any discharge into the air that "would inter-
fere with the enjoyment of life or property."133 In water pollution
statutes, absolute terminology such as Washington's prohibition of
anything "harmful... to... legitimate beneficial uses" is stan-
dard.1 34 Even Connecticut's air statute appears to impose an abso-
lute ban on emissions harmful to "health" or to "property" as con-
trasted with their "enjoyment." Furthermore, the inclusion of
"public welfare" in the category of interests absolutely protected
may subsume "enjoyment" cases and render the unreasonableness
clause irrelevant. Moreover, in Illinois the state supreme court con-
strued the term "unreasonably" in a definition generally similar to
Connecticut's to mean "substantial. ' 13 5 In all these instances the
definition of pollution is so broad that it creates the risk that mil-
lion-dollar enterprises may be shut down to avoid trivial harm.
Many statutes, however, provide relief for such cases through
variance or enforcement provisions expressly acknowledging the
130 E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6003(a) (1974).
3 R.L GEN. LAWS § 46-12-1 (1971). Vermont also defines "waters" to mean surface
waters only. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1251(7) (1973). It adds a separate provision, however,
directing its agency to control "groundwater resources," although it does not define the
term. Id. §§ 1278-1279 (Supp. 1980).
11 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-505 (West 1977), quoted in text at note 109 supra.
" W. VA. CODE § 16-20-2 (1972).
134 WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.48.020 (Supp. 1980).
"' Processing & Books, Inc. v. Pollution Control Bd., 64 IMI. 2d 68, 77, 351 N.E.2d 865,
869 (1976) (construing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1111/2, § 1003(b) (1979)).
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relevance of cost. 3 6 In other states, industry has escaped a general
shutdown despite apparently absolute provisions, presumably
through the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Unbridled discre-
tion, however, invites abuse; it would be preferable explicitly to
make consideration of abatement costs necessary in determining
the existence of a violation. Care should be taken, however, to
place the burden of cost justification on the polluter, who has bet-
ter access to information about his own costs. The insertion of
"unreasonable" or the like in the definition of pollution has an un-
fortunate tendency to lead to a requirement that the plaintiff show
that the costs are not excessive before a violation will be found.137
The typical statute does not require that the pollution be in-
tentionally or negligently caused in order to constitute a viola-
tion. 3 8 There are some exceptions to this general pattern. Arkan-
sas prohibits only knowing pollution of waters,13 9 providing no
incentive to take precautions against accidental spills. Tennessee
more reasonably excepts only "unavoidable accident,"140 thus pre-
serving the incentive. In practice, the effect of a provision allowing
consideration of abatement costs may be equivalent to a require-
ment of negligence.""
E. Actual and Threatened Pollution
A final dimension of these general pollution bans is that they
often lack any prophylactic clause enabling the state to prevent
prospective pollution. For example, Nebraska's provision makes it
unlawful only to "cause" pollution; 42 except under a separate pro-
vision limited to "emergenc[ies],' ' 4 3 no complaint may be issued
until a violation already "has occurred.' 44 The problem may be
alleviated in Nebraska by a broad prohibition on construction or
operation of any emission source without a permit from the state
156 E.g., ALA. CODE ANN. § 22-28-13 (1977); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 42352 (1979);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6011 (1975); HAWAn REV. STAT. § 342-7 (1976); ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
11112, 1035 (1979); Ky. REv. STAT. § 77.260 (1971); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116.07(5) (West
1977); NEv. REV. STAT. § 445.506 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-2-8 (1977); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3704.03(H) (Page Supp. 1980); OR. REv. STAT. § 468.345 (1979).
IS See Currie, Enforcement, supra note 1, at 460-63.
I" See, e.g., NEB. Rzv. STAT. § 81-1506 (Supp. 1978), quoted in text at note 103 supra.
139 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-1938(a) (1976).
1o TENN. CODE ANN. § 70-336 (Supp. 1979).
141 See Currie, Enforcement, supra note 1, at 407-11.
141 NEB. REv. STAT. § 81-1506 (Supp. 1978), quoted in text at note 103 supra.
143 NEB. REv. STAT. § 81-1507(4) (1976).
144 Id. § 81-1507(1).
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pollution control agency,1 45 coupled with a provision directing the
agency to issue a prohibitory order if it determines that a permit
applicant will not conform to the statute.1 " The Connecticut and
Washington definitions of "pollution" quoted above147 permit a
certain degree of prediction as to the effect of a discharge by in-
cluding conditions "likely to be" harmful. Yet these definitions
still require that the discharge itself begin before legal action can
be taken. It would be preferable to prohibit the threat as well as
the actual occurrence of pollution.4 '
IV. VARIANCES
Regulations that are reasonable for most polluters may impose
unjustifiable burdens on individual firms because of special cir-
cumstances. It is therefore common in pollution control statutes, as
in zoning laws, to provide a safety valve in the form of "variances,"
"exemptions," "waivers," "suspensions," or "temporary permits"
allowing deviations from generally applicable requirements.1 49
Idaho, Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, and Wisconsin
make no explicit provision for variances in either their air or water
pollution statutes;150 many other states make no provision for
water pollution variances. 151 Theoretically, this is a grave oversight
that could unjustly force a firm out of business. Yet the substan-
tive equivalent of a variance may often be possible under statutory
enforcement provisions. An agency that finds a violation is to issue
"such ... order . . . as it shall deem appropriate under the cir-
cumstances" in Idaho; 52 "such order as . . . will best further the
purposes" of the statute in Mississippi;"' and an order to comply
145 Id. § 81-1506(2) (Supp. 1978).
's Id. § 81-1506(3). Unfortunately, the order is to prohibit only "construction, installa-
tion or establishment" of the source; the section seems not to apply to existing sources.
147 See text at notes 109-110 supra.
'8 See Currie, Enforcement, supra note 1, at 402-03.
141 For examples, see text and notes at notes 158-192 infra.
250 IDAHO CODE §§ 39-101 to -119 (1977 & Supp. 1979); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 49-17-1 to
-43 (1973 & Supp. 1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:2C-1 to -36 (West 1964 & Supp. 1980) (air);
id. §§ 58.10A-1 to -14 (West Supp. 1980) (water); N.Y. ENVIR. CONSERV. LAW §§ 1-0101 to
19-0711 (McKinney 1973 & Supp. 1979); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 144.30-.57 (West 1974 & Supp.
1978) (air); id. §§ 147.01-.30 (water).
151 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 25-8-101 to -612 (1974 & Supp. 1978); NEV. REv. STAT.
§§ 445.131-.354 (1979).
151 IDAHO CODE § 39-108(4) (1977).
153 Miss. CODE ANN. § 49-17-31(b) (Supp. 1979).
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within a "reasonable specified time" in New Jersey. 54 Hardship
could lead an agency to mitigate the literal requirements of the
applicable standards under any of these provisions. New York ex-
plicitly requires its pollution control agency to consider "the ade-
quacy and practicability of various means of complying" and the
polluter's "financial ability" to do so; if that consideration leads to
the conclusion that "immediate compliance would be impossible or
impractical," the polluter is to be given a "reasonable time" to take
"the required steps." 155 It seems likely that in other states,
prosecutorial discretion will fill the need for flexibility.156 Again,
such discretion invites abuse. Additionally, an explicit variance
procedure offers significant practical advantages: an advance deter-
mination of legality so that the discharger need not violate the
rules to find out his rights, and a public proceeding permitting
presentation of conflicting views and ensuring public evaluation of
administrative decisions. 15 7 Some type of variance mechanism is
therefore highly desirable.
A. The Enabling Clause
Many of the states that authorize variances have basic provi-
sions similar to Alabama's: "The commission may grant individual
variances beyond the limitations prescribed in this chapter when-
ever it is found, upon presentation of adequate proof, that compli-
ance with any rule or regulation, requirement or order of the com-
mission would impose serious hardship without equal or greater
benefits to the public. . . .""' In short, the commission is to bal-
ance the costs and benefits of compliance.159
Common phrases such as "serious hardship without equal or
I4 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 6:2C-14 (West 1973).
151 N.Y. ENvin. CONSERV. LAw § 19-0509(3) (McKinney 1973).
156 It did so in Illinois before there was a provision for water variances. See Act of July
12, 1951, 1951 11. Laws 1462 (repealed 1970).
1'7 See Currie, Enforcement, supra note 1, at 468-69.
1" ALA. CODE § 22-28-13(a) (1977).
159 A similar approach was taken in Hawaii, which requires that a variance be given
only when "[t]he continuation of the function or operation involved in the discharge of
waste by the granting of the variance is in the public interest," HAWAII REv. STAT. § 342-
7(c)(1) (1976), which in turn is to be determined so as to secure the "optimum balance
between economic development and environmental quality." Id. § 342-6(c) (Supp. 1980).
Other states specify that the competing interests to be considered are those of the applicant,
of other property owners likely to be affected by the discharge, and of the general public.
E.g., NEv. REv. STAT. § 445.506(2) (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-2-8(B) (1979); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 10, § 561(b) (1973); WASH. Rzv. CODE ANN. § 70.94.181(b)(2) (1975).
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greater benefits"160 suggest that a polluter can obtain a variance
whenever he can demonstrate that control costs are marginally
greater than the less easily measured harm done by allowing the
pollution. But to determine de novo in every case whether compli-
ance is a good thing is to nullify the administrative benefits of
adopting general regulations. In contrast, the Illinois statute
authorizes variances only when compliance would "impose an arbi-
trary or unreasonable hardship. 16 1 The state Pollution Control
Board has construed this to mean that "a variance is to be granted
only in those extraordinary situations in which the cost of compli-
ance is wholly disproportionate to the benefits; doubts are to be
resolved in favor of denial. 1 62 This approach should keep the vari-
ance process manageable.
Several states that employ the "equal" public benefits test
substitute more demanding terms for "serious hardship." The air
pollution control law in Kentucky, for example, allows a variance
[i]f the hearing board finds that because of conditions beyond,
control compliance... will result in an arbitrary and unrea-
sonable taking of property or in the practical closing and
elimination of any lawful business, occupation or activity, in
either case without a sufficient corresponding benefit or ad-
vantage to the people in the reduction of air contamination.16 3
The use of "unreasonable" suggests that the Kentucky standard is
similar to the Illinois position, but closer inspection reveals signifi-
cant differences. On the one hand, Kentucky allows a variance
whenever the cost of closing a business outweighs the benefits,
without requiring that the cost be unreasonable; on the other,
Kentucky does not allow a variance unless a business is closed or a
"taking" of property occurs, even if the costs of compliance are
unreasonable when compared with the benefits.'" The use of the
phrase "because of conditions beyond control" in a number of stat-
I"o There also are alternatives, such as those referring to "corresponding benefit," CAL.
HEALTH & SAMEY CODE § 42352 (West 1979), and to "sufficient corresponding benefit or
advantage to the people," Ky. Rzv. STAT. § 77.260(1) (1971).
161 ILL. Rxv. STAT. ch. 111 h, 1 1035 (1979).
12 EPA v. Lindgren Foundry Co., 1 IlM. P.C.B. 11, 16-17 (1970). Minnesota's reference
to "undue hardship" in its variance clause, MNN. STAT. ANN. § 116.07(5) (West 1977), is
susceptible to the same interpretation.
162 Ky. Rav. STAT. § 77.260(1) (1970).
16 These drawbacks led to the abandonment of a nearly identical formulation in an
earlier Illinois air pollution law. See Air Pollution Control Act § 11(a), 1963 M11. Laws 3198
(repealed 1970).
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utes, such as Kentucky's, seems to import an appropriate require-
ment of good faith, which has also been found to be implicitly rele-
vant to the interpretation of "unreasonable hardship" in Illinois."'
Oregon departs from the standard form by listing the particu-
lar hardships that justify a variance:
The commission shall grant such specific variance only if it
finds that strict compliance with the rule or standard is in-
appropriate because:
(a) Conditions exist that are beyond the control of the per-
sons granted such variance; or
(b) Special circumstances render strict compliance unreason-
able, burdensome or impractical due to special physical condi-
tions or cause; or
(c) Strict compliance would result in substantial curtailment
or closing down of a business, plant or operation; or
(d) No other alternative facility or method of handling is yet
available."6
There is an obvious danger that some types of real hardships may
be inadvertently omitted from such a list, making it impossible for
a deserving firm to obtain a variance.
Some states impose other limits on the balancing process. In
North Carolina, for instance, variances are authorized only if
"[tihe discharge of waste or emission of air contaminants occurring
or proposed to occur do [sic] not endanger human health or
safety. 16 7 Health and safety are given absolute protection. We do
not forbid all driving that endangers human life, however, for the
costs would be too great. Similarily, absolute health protection in a
pollution statute entails the risk that a significant portion of indus-
try would be closed down. A few states carry absolute protection
"e See Currie, Enforcement, supra note 1, at 420-26.
O& REV. STAT. § 468.345 (1979).
167 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.3(e)(1) (Supp. 1979). Other statutes with comparable re-
strictions include HAwAIi REv. STAT. § 342-7 (Supp. 1979) (no variance if pollution would
"substantially endanger human health or safety"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-3013 (Supp. 1979)
(no variance where pollution would "endanger or tend significantly to endanger human
health or safety"); NEV. REv. STAT. § 445.506 (1977) (no variance if "human" health or
safety would be endangered); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-2-8 (1979) (no variance if pollution
endangers or tends to endanger "health or safety"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 561 (1973) (no
variance if "human" health or safety would be endangered); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 70.94.181 (1975) (no variance if "public" health or safety would be endangered). But cf.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-1513 (1976) (variance may be granted if emissions "do not endanger or
tend to endanger human health or safety or ... compliance ... would produce serious
hardship without equal or greater benefits to the public") (emphasis added).
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even beyond health and safety, making variances nearly impossible
to obtain. For example, Alabama forbids variances unless "the
emissions occurring, or proposed to occur, do not endanger or tend
to endanger human health or safety, human comfort and aesthetic
values."1 68
Most states provide for variances from the pollution control
statutes themselves as well as from the rules and regulations
promulgated thereunder.6 9 Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska, Nevada, Ohio,
Utah, and Vermont, however, do not allow relief from the statutory
provisions. 170 This omission may be unintentional, as is the case in
Illinois. 171 It probably makes little difference in the case of the
Ohio air pollution control program, where almost every prohibition
is to be set in motion only at the discretion of the agency. 17 2 In a
less flexible system 7 3 the omission is troublesome.
I" ALA. CODE § 22-28-13(a) (1977). South Carolina, parroting a federal provision since
repealed, authorizes its agency to grant variances when it determines that
(1) good faith efforts have been made to comply with such requirement before such
date;
(2) such source (or class) is unable to comply with such requirement because the nec-
essary technology or other alternative methods of control are not reasonably avail-
able or have not been available for a sufficient period of time;
(3) any available alternative operating procedure and interim control measures have
reduced or will reduce the impact of such source on public health;
(4) the continued operation of such source is essential to national security or to the
public health or welfare.
S.C. CODE § 48-1-140(b) (Supp. 1979); accord, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(f)(1) (1976) (repealed
1977), criticized in Currie, Federal Air-Quality Standards and Their Implementation, 1976
Am. BAR FoUNAnoN RESEARCH J. 365, 380-81. This statute responds poorly to the compet-
ing interests. Evidently there can be no variance, however great the hardship, unless the
source is "essential." No comparison of the hardship of compliance with the harm of al-
lowing the variance is required or allowed. In addition, the provision permits variances only
from enforcement orders; thus in South Carolina variances cannot serve to clarify obliga-
tions in advance of prosecution.
148 E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.201 (West Supp. 1980); Ky. REv. STAT. § 77.245 (1970).
170 IOWA CODE ANN. § 455B.22 (West Supp. 1980); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-3013 (Supp.
1979); NEn. REv. STAT. § 81-1513 (1976); NEV. REv. STAT. § 445.506 (1979); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3704.03(H) (Page Supp. 1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-24-11(5) (1976); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 10, § 561 (1973).
171 See IhL. Rav. STAT. ch. 1111/2, 1 1035 (1979). The unintentional exclusion of the
statutory provisions is described in Currie, Enforcement, supra note 1, at 408-09.
172 See OHIO Ray. CODE ANN. § 3704.03 (Page Supp. 1980) ("director of environmental
protection may... issue ... orders prohibiting or abating emissions") (emphasis added).
17S Iowa is an example. See IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 455B.10-.29 (West Supp. 1980). "The
commission shall ... consider complaints ... issue orders ... [and] cause to be instituted
by the attorney general.., legal proceedings to compel compliance .. " Id. § 455B.12
(emphasis added).
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B. Conditions
The terms of a variance may simply be left to the discretion of
the granting agency, as in Pennsylvania, 174 or they may be dictated
by statute. One example is the Florida Air and Water Pollution
Control Act, which provides that a "temporary operating permit"
granted for traditional variance considerations shall:
1. Specify the manner, nature, volume, and frequency of the
discharge permitted;
2. Require the proper operation and maintenance of any in-
terim or temporary pollution abatement facility or system re-
quired by the department as a condition of the permit;
3. Require the permit holder to maintain such monitoring
equipment and make and file such records and reports as the
department deems necessary to insure compliance with the
terms of the permit and to evaluate the effects of the dis-
charge upon the receiving waters;
4. Be valid only for the period of time necessary for the per-
mit holder to place into operation the facility, system, or
method contemplated in his application as determined by the
department; and
5. Contain other requirements and restrictions which the de-
partment deems necessary and desirable to protect the quality
of the receiving waters and promote the public interest.17 5
Most states have provided some degree of statutory direction as to
the terms of a variance between these two extremes. 178
Even the least structured statutes are almost certain to have a
provision requiring a time limitation as a condition of the variance.
A number of states limit all variances to one year but make them
subject to renewal. 177 Others set three possible time limitations,
each dependent upon the reason for variance.7  The New Mexico
174 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 4013.5(a) (Purdon 1977).
175 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.088(4)(d) (West 1973).
176 See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 455B.22 (West Supp. 1980); OHIO Ray. CODE ANN.
§ 3704.03(H) (Page Supp. 1980).
177 E.g., ALA. CODE § 22-28-13(c) (1977); Ky. REV. STAT. § 77.270 (1970); MICH. Com'.
LAws ANN. § 366.32 (1975); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3704.03(H) (Page Supp. 1980); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-1802(J)(d) (West Supp. 1979); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-25-15(c) (1968);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 53-3415(C)(8) (1977). South Dakota's water pollution law is something
of an aberration in that it requires that a variance be "reviewed" every two years. S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34A-2-26 (1977).
178 ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.170(c) (1977); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-3013(c) (Supp. 1979); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 81-1513(3) (1976); NEv. REv. STAT. § 445.516(1) (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-
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statute, for example, provides that:
(1) if the variance is granted on the ground that there is no
practicable means known or available for the adequate pre-
vention, abatement or control of the air pollution involved, it
shall be only until the necessary means for prevention, abate-
ment or control become known and available;
(2) if the variance is granted on the ground that compliance
with the particular requirement or requirements from which
the variance is sought will necessitate the taking of measures
which, because of their extent or cost, must be spread over a
considerable period of time, it shall be for a period not to
exceed such reasonable time as, in the view of the board, is
requisite for the taking of necessary measures... ;
(3) if the variance is granted on the ground that it is justi-
fied to relieve or prevent hardship of a kind other than that
provided for in Paragraphs (1) or (2) of this subsection, it
shall be for not more than one year.179
The two exceptions to the one-year limitation appear sensible at
first glance. The first, however, is poorly executed, since additional
time will be needed to install equipment after it becomes "known
and available." Furthermore, while annual renewals may increase
administrative costs, they also help to ensure that the agency
monitors continuing progress.
Almost all states statutorily allow or require pollution control
agencies to attach to variances conditions that serve as alternatives
for the regulation being set aside. In Michigan, for example,
[t]he commission shall consider the reasonableness of granting
a variance conditioned upon the person effecting a partial
control of the particular air pollution or progressive control of
the air pollution over a period of time which it considers rea-
sonable under all the circumstances; or the commission may
prescribe other and different reasonable regulations with
which the person receiving the variance shall comply. 80
While this power may be implicit in general variance provisions
2-8 (1979); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 34A-1-31 to -33 (1977) (air pollution variances); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 561(c) (1973); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 70.94.181(3) (1975); Wyo. STAT.
§ 35-11-601(b), (c), (e) (1977).
17° N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-2-8 (1979).
'" MICH. Cjmw. LAws ANN. § 366.30 (1975).
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that do not specifically grant it,181 the inclusion of such a clause
increases the probability that a variance will not be a simple i-
cense to pollute, but rather a blueprint for compliance as soon as
practicable.
The Illinois provision requiring posting of a performance
bond,182 which I have discussed elsewhere, 183 is an effort to create a
financial incentive toward living up to variance conditions. The
effectiveness of such an incentive depends, of course, upon the
willingness of the responsible officials to enforce forfeiture.
C. Variance Procedure
Many states, though not all, provide for administrative hear-
ings upon variance applications.1 84 The statutory formulas vary. A
hearing may be required before a variance can be granted,185 or
before one can be denied. s18 Special provisions sometimes require
hearings for renewal, revocation, or modification of existing
variances.18 7
It seems clear that in general a quasi-judicial hearing is a help-
ful means of ascertaining the facts relevant to the grant or denial
of a variance. Furthermore, if a pollution statute creates a substan-
181 An example is S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 34A-1-30 (1977).
1s2 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 111Y2, 1036 (1979).
'83 Currie, Enforcement, supra note 1, at 471.
18 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-28-13(d) (1977) (requiring notice of petition in newspaper
of general circulation, but allowing grant of variance without hearing unless commission
considers hearing advisable, or "any person" files written objection to the variance); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 82-1939 (1976) (no hearing required when director recommends grant of vari-
ance, except on petition of person aggrieved by such grant); Ky. REv. STAT. § 77.250 (1975)
(providing that board "may" hold hearing on own motion or request of any person); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 74-2-8(D) (1979) (requiring a hearing when director recommends granting the
variance, and also on request of petitioner when board opposes the variance); OHIO REv.
CODE ANN. § 3704.03(H) (Page Supp. 1980) (providing that director "may" hold hearing);
TrNN. CODE AN. § 53-3415(c) (1977) (hearing required only if technical secretary opposed
variance, and if board concludes hearing is "advisable"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-24-11(5)
(1976) (requiring a public "meeting"). Cf. S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. §§ 34A-1-24 to -27
(1977) (no specific provision for variance hearings).
19 E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.170 (1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 561(b) (1973); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 70.94.181(1) (1975).
1" E.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 203.110(4), 204.061(5) (Vernon 1972 & Supp. 1980); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 53-3415(c) (1977); TEX. Rlv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 4477-5, § 3.22(d) (Vernon
1976) (hearing required only if requested by local government or if pollution control agency
concludes it is advisable).
168 E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 83-1939 (1976) (hearing required before variance can be
denied, revoked, or modified); MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 336.33 (1975) (hearing required for
revocation, although no hearing required for grant of variance, id. § 336.31); OR. REv. STAT.
§ 468.345(5) (1979) (hearing required before revocation or modification).
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tive right in the polluter to obtain relief upon meeting prescribed
criteria, contemporary Supreme Court opinions strongly suggest
that the polluter has a property interest within the protection of
the due process clause, and that he is entitled to a quasi-judicial
hearing if his allegations state a claim on which relief can be
granted.188 Although the grant of a variance may adversely affect
the polluter's neighbors, it seems unlikely that they are given any
comparable property interest by a pollution control statute.189
Whether they can require a hearing therefore seems to be up to the
state legislature or its delegate, the control agency.
As a policy matter, a hearing seems desirable whenever there
is any substantial room for doubt over the facts, even if no one has
requested it. This conclusion follows from the frequent absence of
any genuine adversary to the variance applicant: neighbors who
will be harmed by the grant of a variance often do not make an
appearance to contest it. The first obstacle is to notify them. They
may be too numerous to make personal notice practicable-an en-
tire city may be affected-and a legal notice in the back pages of a
newspaper is likely to go largely unread. Illinois has tried to miti-
gate the problem by giving personal notice to those who have re-
quested notice of variance applications in their vicinity,190 but even
this practice is certain to leave many who would be injured by the
requested variance uninformed.
Moreover, notice is only the first difficulty. Often those who
know of and would be individually harmed by the grant of a vari-
ance application will not find it worth the effort to mount a case in
opposition, even if the aggregate effect of the variance would be
considerable. One common response to this problem is to give a
government agency the responsibility to investigate the facts and
to present a recommendation to those empowered to pass on the
variance.191 Illinois experience 9 2 suggests this is a useful expedientbut not the equivalent of a true adversary process. Among other
16 See Currie, The Mobile-Source Provisions of the Clean Air Act, 46 U. CHi. L. Rv.
811, 844-45 (1979). Like the applicant for bar admission, see Willner v. Committee on Char-
acter & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963), and the welfare recipient, see Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254 (1970), the polluter claims an "entitlement" that would seem to constitute a prop-
erty interest protected by the due process clause.
186 See League of Women Voters v. North Shore Sanitary Dist., 1111. P.C.B. 576 (1971).
1,0 ILL. REv. STAT. ch 112, 11 1037 (1979).
" See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-28-13(d) (1977); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-1939 (1976); ILL.
Rv. STAT. ch. 1111/2, 1 1037 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-2-8(D) (1979); TkNN. CODE ANN.
§ 53-3415(i) (1977).
19' See Currie, Enforcement, supra note 1, at 468-75.
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things, the recommending agency properly feels that its responsi-
bility is to advocate the outcome best for society as a whole; the
arguments of the victims of the variance, therefore, may never be
presented to those making the decision. A requirement that an ap-
plicant for a variance prove that the cost of compliance signifi-
cantly outweighs the benefits would be an additional safeguard for
the interests of absent victims.
V. ENFORCEMENT
A. Cease-and-Desist Orders
The basic mechanism for enforcement of the pollution laws is
the administrative order to cease and desist from violations of the
statute or regulations. Cease-and-desist authority apparently exists
in every air or water pollution program. 193 The advantages of ad-
ministrative rather than judicial enforcement include the value of
experience with complex technical issues, the possibility of more
expeditious proceedings, the elimination of disparity in interpreta-
tion, the avoidance of congestion in the regular courts, and, not
least, the possibility of appointing personnel sympathetic to the
goals of the program.194
As one would expect, a hearing normally precedes issuance of
a cease-and-desist order, and it generally resembles a judicial
trial.195 Most states authorize issuance of orders without a prior
hearing in an emergency. 96 Most, but not all, of these require a
hearing within a specified time after issuance of an emergency or-
193 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-7 (1975); HAwAH RE V. STAT. § 342-8 (1976).
In the District of Columbia the pollution control agency is not explicitly given the authority
to issue cease-and-desist orders. It is, however, authorized to "issue such orders as may be
necessary to enforce the regulations... and enforce such orders by all appropriate adminis-
trative and judicial proceedings, including injunctive relief." D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 6-
813(b)(2) (West Supp. 1970). This language appears to include cease-and-desist orders.
19 Cf. Currie & Goodman, Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action: Quest
for the Optimum Forum, 75 COLUM. L. Ray. 1, 62-74 (1975) (discussing the advantages and
disadvantages of specialized courts for review of administrative action).
195 See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1111/, 1031-1033 (1979) (providing for pleadings,
representation by counsel, cross-examination, stenographic transcription, and written opin-
ions); MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 336.20 (West 1975) (providing for pleadings, counsel, com-
pulsory process, testimony under oath, and recording of testimony).
1" E.g., CoLo. Ray. STAT. §§ 25-7-112 to -113 (Supp. 1979); IowA CODE ANN. § 455B.18
(West Supp. 1980); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-3012 (Supp. 1979); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 125:84
(1978); N.Y. ENVm. CONsEnv. LAW § 71-0301 (McKinney Supp. 1979); OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3704.032 (Page 1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-24-11(4) (1976).
[48:27
State Pollution Statutes
der;197 due process probably requires that a hearing take place as
soon as practicable.198 A number of states provide an additional
safeguard against abuse of the emergency power by requiring that
such orders be issued or approved by the Governor.19'
To obtain sanctions for the violation of an administrative or-
der, it is necessary in most states to go to court. 00 This two-step
process can delay enforcement and weaken the agency, especially
in the extreme case in which a court may examine the order de
novo.2 01 Often, however, judicial review is limited to whether the
agency acted arbitrarily, unreasonably, or contrary to the manifest
weight of the evidence.2 03 This traditional standard of appellate re-
1'7 Colorado, New Hampshire, and Ohio, for example, make no mention either of time
or of a hearing. COLO. Rxv. STAT. §§ 25-7-112 to -113 (Supp. 1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 125:84 (1978); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3704.032 (Page 1980). A number of states require
hearings within 24 hours. E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-3012 (Supp. 1979); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 26-24-11(4) (1976); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 560 (1973). In contrast, Nebraska allows 10
days before the hearing, NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-1507(4) (1976), and New York allows 15, N.Y.
ENvIw CONSERV. LAw § 71-0301 (McKinney Supp. 1979).
"9 See, e.g., Commissioner v. Shapiro, 424 U.S. 614, 629 & n.11 (1976) (construing stat-
ute narrowly to avoid constitutional problem caused by lack of hearing); North Ga. Finish-
ing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
I" E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-3012 (Supp. 1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125:84 (1978);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3704.032 (Page 1980); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 560 (1973). Utah
requires not only the Governor's concurrence, but also that a hearing be held before the
Governor within 24 hours after the emergency order is issued. UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-24-
11(4) (1976). South Carolina merely requires notice to the Governor, who can then order
that a hearing be held within 48 hours after the emergency order is issued. S.C. CODE § 48-1-
290 (1977).
20 E.g., ALAsKA STAT. §§ 46.03.760, .765 (1977); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-787, -1715
(1974); id. §§ 36-1864, -1864.01 (Supp. 1979); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-1909 (1976); COLO. REv.
STAT. §§ 25-7-2, -122 (Supp. 1979); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-516 (West 1977); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 7, § 6005 (Supp. 1978).
201 E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-1906(7) (1976) (court may in its discretion and on own
motion or motion of party take additional evidence on any issue or try any or all issues de
novo; no jury); IND. STAT. ANN. § 13-1-3-11 (Burns 1973) (action for compliance "shall" be
tried de novo, with right to jury); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.5(b) (1978) (matter "shall be
heard and determined de novo on the transcript [of the administrative hearing] ... and
any.., additional evidence"); W. VA. CODE § 16-20-10 (1979) (emergency orders reviewed
de novo).
202 E.g., Aiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-1868(c) (Supp. 1979Y (review in trial court limited
to "whether administrative record as may be supplemented by other evidence supports such
order or determination by substantial evidence"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 70-333 (Supp. 1979)
(review on transcripts only, and only as to whether decision was supported by substantial
evidence); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-24-12 (1976) (review in state supreme court on transcripts,
limited to whether agency acted without or in excess of powers and whether findings were
supported by substantial evidence); VA. CODE § 10-17.23:2 (Supp. 1978) (air pollution) (re-
view on transcript, order, exhibits, and "such additional evidence as may be necessary to
resolve any controversy as to the correctness of the record" or "as the ends of justice re-
quire"; no jury; court may modify or reverse if board acted unconstitutionally, in excess of
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view leaves debatable technical questions and policy matters to the
expert administrative body while preserving some vestige of the
constitutional assignment of judicial power to the courts.20 -
B. Civil and Criminal Penalties
If no penalties could be assessed until after an administrative
cease-and-desist order had been violated, the polluter would get
one free bite; there would be no incentive for a polluter to comply
until caught. Consequently, most states authorize the imposition of
penalties for violations of the law and regulations as well as of an
earlier cease-and-desist order. Some allow the agency itself to im-
pose monetary penalties;204 in others, the agency, or the state at-
torney general on its behalf, must go to court.205
The nominal amounts of permissible penalties are in many
cases rather trivial. Nevada, for example, limits the penalty for a
violation to not more than $5,000.206 Yet "each day of violation"
under the Nevada statute "constitutes a separate offense"; 20 7 even
a small sum, compounded daily, may mount up significantly over
time. Nevertheless, such limits may make the threat of a penalty
an insufficient incentive for compliance when the cost of control
equipment is in the millions of dollars. Connecticut's basic ap-
proach is preferable. While absolute numerical limits unfortunately
remain, Connecticut authorizes its commissioner to establish a
penalty schedule in such amounts "as to insure immediate and
continued compliance with applicable laws, regulations, orders and
permits.12 0  Violation, in other words, is to be made more expen-
sive than compliance.209
authority or jurisdiction, on unlawful procedure or other error of law, or if action was "un-
supported by the evidence on the record considered as a whole" or was "arbitrary, capri-
cious, or an abuse of discretion"); id. § 62.1-44.29 (1973) (water pollution) (same).
110 See generally 4 K. DAvis, ADmiNsTRATVE LAW TREATISE §§ 29.01-.11 (1958).
oE.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-6b (West 1975 & Supp. 1980); ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
11112, 1033(b) (1979); NEv. Rzv. STAT. § 445.601 (1979).
205 E.g., ALA. CODE § 22-28-22 (1975); IOWA CODE ANN. § 455B.25 (West Supp. 1980);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-2-12 (1979); N.D. CENr. CODE §§ 23-25-10 (1978); id. § 61-28-08
(Supp. 1979).
2- NEv. Rlv. STAT. § 445.601(1) (1979).
207 Id.
,03 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-6b(a) (West Supp. 1980).
10, Similar statutes include ALAsKA STAT. § 46.03.760 (1977) ($500 to $100,000 for initial
violation and up to $5,000 per day thereafter, "which shall reflect ... the economic savings
realized by the person in not complying with the requirement for which a violation is
charged," id. § 46.03.760(a)(3); the penalty must not, however, be punitive-only "compen-
satory and remedial," id. § 46.03.760(b)); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-170d (Supp. 1979) (penalty
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Criminal sanctions also are commonly provided, but usually
only for intentional or, in some cases, "criminally negligent" viola-
tions.210 No criminal penalties are provided for water pollution in-
fractions in at least one state, Georgia.211
C. Expenses and Damages
In addition to penalties, an agency frequently has the power to
seek compensation from a polluter. For instance, Nevada provides
that actual damages to the state may be recovered, 21 2 including
"any expenses incurred in removing, correcting and terminating
any adverse effects resulting from the discharge of pollutants" and
"compensation for any loss or destruction of wildlife, fish or
aquatic life and any other actual damages caused by the
violation. '21 3
D. Permits
Permit requirements for potential pollution sources serve a
number of purposes. Permit systems facilitate the collection of
necessary information; ensure continual surveillance rather than
spasmodic responses to complaints; make it possible to prevent
rather than merely abate pollution; allow a polluter to obtain a de-
termination that proposed control devices will suffice before mak-
ing an actual investment in them; and make enforcement easier by
requiring the polluter to prove compliance with the law.2 14
For these reasons, and in order to qualify for participation in
of up to $10,000 per violation per day in an amount that "shall constitute an actual and
substantial economic deterrent to the violation," id. § 65-170d(b)); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 147.21
(West 1974) ("In determining the amount of the fine... the court shall assess an amount
which represents an actual and substantial economic deterrent to the action which was the
basis of the conviction," id. § 147.21(3), up to varying maxima dependent upon whether the
pollution was a first offense or was intentional).
210 E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 13-7-13-3 (Burns Supp. 1980) ("intentionally, knowingly,
recklessly, or negligently"); NEV. Rav. STAT. § 445.334 (1979) (criminal penalties for anyone
"who intentionally or with criminal negligence" commits violation). Cf. ARIZ. Rzv. STAT.
ANN. § 36-1864.02 (Supp. 1979) (most violations of statute or regulations are punishable as a
class 2 misdemeanor; "criminal negligence" makes the discharge of a pollutant a class 1
misdemeanor).
" See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 17-502 to -528 (Supp. 1980). Id. § 17-521.2 provides for civil
penalties only.
2' Nav. Rzv. STAT. § 445.331(2) (1979).
13 Id. § 445.331(3). The most complex monetary provisions are found in relation to oil
spills, e.g., VA. CODE § 62.1-44.34 (Supp. 1980).
'14 See Currie, Enforcement, supra note 1, at 476.
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federal pollution control programs, 215 nearly every state pollution
statute requires permits for the construction or operation of poten-
tial sources, or for both.216 In a few states it is left to the discretion
of the agency whether to require permits21 or to delineate the clas-
ses of pollution sources for which permits are necessary.21 Some
statutes contain sensible exceptions for trivial sources,219 or delega-
tions of the authority to make such exceptions. 220 Construction
permits are more commonly required by air pollution statutes than
operating permits.2 2 States that make no provision for the latter
are forgoing an important enforcement device and information
source with respect to existing installations.
Until 1977 a state could participate in the federal air pollution
program without requiring any permits at all, so long as it pro-
vided for preconstruction "review" of the "location" of any new
source.222 While a permit program was the obvious means of pro-
viding such review, it was not the only means. The statute made it
'15 See 33 U.S.C. § 1256(f)(2) (1976); id. §§ 1319, 1342 (Supp. H 1978); 42 U.S.C.
§9 7405, 7410(a)(2)(D) (Supp. II 1978).
216 A number of states specifically enclose the NPDES program in their pollution con-
trol statutes. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-1904 (12)(2) (1976); GA. CODE ANN. 9 17-505(a)(16)
(Supp. 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115.03 (5) (West 1977); NEB. REv. STAT. 9 81-1505(11),
(19) (Supp. 1979); id. § 81-1506(2)(a) (Supp. 1978); Nav. REv. STAT. § 445.214 (1979); N.Y.
ENvn. CONsEaV. LAW §§ 17-0801 to -0829 (McKinney Supp. 1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 70-
328(8) (Supp. 1979); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1258(b) (Supp. 1980); WAsH. Rav. CODE ANN.
§ 90.48.260 (Supp. 1980); W. VA. CODE § 20-5A-3(a)(1) (Supp. 1980). In other states, differ-
ent combinations of the following activities may be carried out only under permit- installa-
tion, construction, modification, alteration, operation, use or maintenance of pollution
sources or control devices, or discharge therefrom. See, e.g., ILL. RE V. STAT. ch. 1111/2, 1
1039(a) (1979).
217 E.g., CAL. HALTH & SAFETY CODE § 42300 (West 1979); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 22a-6(4) (West 1975); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-3008 (Supp. 1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-2-7
(1979).
216 E.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 203.075(1) (Vernon Supp. 1980) (unlawful to commence con-
struction of a contaminant source without permit "if such source is of a class fixed by regu-
lation of the commission which requires a permit therefore"); W. VA. CODE § 16-20-11b
(1972) ("commission shall by rule and regulation specify the class or categories of stationary
sources" for which permits will be required).
2E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-1934 (1976) (exempting, inter alia, noncommercial barbe-
cue equipment); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 42310 (West 1979) (same).
110 E.g., COLO. RIV. STAT. § 25-7-114(5)(a) (Supp. 1979); WASH. RaV. CODE ANN.
§ 90.48.160 (Supp. 1979).
121 Compare ALAsKA STAT. § 46.03.160 (1977) ("construction, installation or establish-
ment"); COLO. Rav. STAT. § 25-7-112 (1974) (construction, substantial alteration, installa-
tion, and "commencement" of operation, conduct or performance) and N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 74-2-7 (1979) ("constructing or modifying") with Nav. REv. STAT. § 445.491 (1979) ("oper-
ating permits").
42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(2)(D) (1976) (revised and transferred to 42 U.S.C. § 7410
(Supp. 1[ 1978) by Act of Aug. 7, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 691).
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clear that a state satisfied the federal requirements if it provided
"adequate authority to prevent the construction or modification of
any new source . . . at any location which . . . will prevent the
attainment and maintenance... of a national ambient air quality
... standard," and required that the owner "submit... such in-
formation as may be necessary to permit the State to make a de-
termination" under the former clause.22 3 Among the few jurisdic-
tions that have no permit provisions, Vermont and Wisconsin
appear to require the information and confer the authority for-
merly requisite for participation in the federal program;224 the Dis-
trict of Columbia and Oklahoma do not.225 Amendments to the
federal law in 1977 provide that a state pollution control plan will
not qualify unless it requires permits for all major new sources,22 6
and it seems likely that the carrot of federal grants227 will bring
about the enactment of additional state permit requirements in
the near future.2 2 8
The basic criterion for issuance of a permit follows logically
from its purposes: a permit will be granted upon a showing that
the activity will conform to all applicable substantive require-
ments.229 Various conditions are often imposed on the permit re-
223 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(4) (1976) (revised and transferred to 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (Supp.
H 1978) by Act of Aug. 7, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 691).
"' VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 554(4) (authority to issue "orders as may be necessary to
effectuate the purposes of this chapter"); id. § 555(b) (1973) (required reports from opera-
tors of air contaminant sources); id. § 559 (authority to order "prevention" of emissions);
Wis. STAT. ANN. 144.31 (West 1974) (authority to issue "orders to effectuate the purpose" of
the chapter); id. § 144.35(1)(b) (authority to issue "appropriate order for the prevention...
of the problems involved" in a violation); id. § 144.38 (required reports from operators of
those types of air contaminant sources specified by state pollution control agency).
"5 D.C. CODE ENCYCL. §§ 6-811 to -813 (West Supp. 1970); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63,
§§ 1-1801 to -1808 (West Supp. 1979).
-6 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410(a)(2)(D), 7475, 7502(b)(6) (Supp. 1[ 1978).
I" Id. § 7405 (Supp. II 1978).
2" Indeed, New York and Louisiana, which formerly had no provision for air pollution
permits, enacted permit provisions in 1979. N.Y. Eirm. CoNSERv. LAW §§ 19-0301 to -0302
(McKinney Supp. 1979); LA. Rav. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:1084-:1085 (Supp. 1980).
22* See, e.g., CAL. HnsATH & SAFET CODE § 42301 (West 1979) (requiring that the
"article, machine, equipment or contrivance for which the permit was issued shall not pre-
vent or interfere with the attainment or maintenance of any applicable air quality stan-
dard," id. § 42301(a), and "will comply with all applicable orders, rules, and regulations,"
id. § 42301(b)); COLO. Rlv. STAT. § 25-7-114(g)I(A) (Supp. 1978) ("proposed source or activ-
ity" must "meet all applicable emission control regulations"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.087
(West Supp. 1980) (permit allowed "only when ... the installation is provided or equipped
with pollution control facilities that will abate or prevent pollution to the degree that will
comply with the standards or rules promulgated by the department ... and which will
comply with [federal regulations]").
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cipient to assure compliance;230 permits are usually issued for a
limited but renewable period, in order to assure reconsideration; 23 1
and revocation of the permit is generally provided as a remedy for
violation of permit conditions.23 2
As in the case of variances, 33 many states attempt to provide
an opportunity for the general public to participate in the permit
process. Colorado requires that notice of permit applications be
"circulated in a manner to inform interested and potentially inter-
ested persons of the proposed discharge and of the proposed deter-
mination to issue or deny a permit, 21 34 but it gives little guidance
on the vexing question of how that is to be accomplished.2 85 Texas
requires notice to "persons who in the judgment of the commission
may be affected" 2 6-an impossible task if individual notice is con-
templated in all cases, and as unhelpful a formulation as Colo-
rado's if it is not.237 Other approaches to the same problem have
,30 E.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 204.051(3) (Vernon Supp. 1980) (if source "meets or will
meet" requirements of law and regulations, agency secretary "shall issue a permit with such
conditions as he deems necessary to insure that the source will meet the requirements [of
the act] and any federal water pollution control act as it applies to sources in this state");
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-2-7(G) (1979) (permit may be conditioned on "individual emission
limits," "a requirement that such source install and operate best available control technol-
ogy ... or technology sufficient to achieve the lowest achievable emission rate ... to the
extent necessary to meet the requirements of the federal act" and "reasonable restrictions
and limitations other than restrictions and limitations relating to emission limits or emis-
sion rates"); OHIO Rsv. CODE ANN. § 3704.03(G) (Page 1980) (permits conditioned on right
of entry in reasonable fashion for inspection purposes).
"I E.g., NEv. REv. STAT. § 445.227 (1979) (water pollution permits issuable for "fixed
terms not to exceed 5 years").
132 E.g., CAL. HEmTH & SAFETY CODE § 42307 (West 1979) (revocation may be sought if
air pollution permit holder is in violation of "any applicable order, rule, or regulation");
COLO. REv. STAT. § 25-8-604 (1974) (suspension, modification or revocation for violation of
permit provision); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.087(6) (West 1973) (revocation for false or inaccu-
rate information in application; violation of law, orders, rules, regulations, or permit condi-
tions; failure to submit operational reports or refusal to permit inspection). Cf. Mo. STAT.
ANN. § 204.056(4) (Vernon Supp. 1980):
[Permits] may be terminated or modified if obtained in violation [of the act] or by
misrepresentation or failing to fully disclose all relevant facts, or when required to pre-
vent violations of any provision [of the act] or to protect the waters of this state, when
such action is required by a change in conditions or the existence of a condition which
requires either a temporary or permanent reduction or elimination of the authorized
discharge ....
2" See text at notes 184-192 supra.
134 CoLo. REv. STAT. § 25-8-502(3) (1974).
23 The statute calls only for "circulation" in the geographic area of the discharge and
mailed notice to those who ask to be on a mailing list to be maintained by the pollution
control agency. Id. § 25-8-503.
" TEx. WATER CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 26.028 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
137 The statute does call for notice of certain permits to be given to the mayor and local
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been discussed above in connection with variances.238
Many state air or water pollution programs provide for some
type of public hearings on permit applications. Under the Connect-
icut water statute, hearings are mandatory in all cases;23 9 such a
requirement may impose an unnecessary burden when the facts are
not subject to dispute.240 More commonly, hearings are mandatory
only on denial of a permit, and then only when requested by the
aggrieved applicant,2 41 presumably because only the applicant is
likely to have a constitutionally protected interest in the matter. 42
VI. INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
Illinois has a unique mechanism for the administration of its
pollution control program. An Environmental Protection Agency
subject to the Governor fills the role of prosecutor; an independent
Pollution Control Board, composed of full-time officials, acts as the
rulemaking and adjudicatory authority; and long-range planning is
in the hands of an independent Institute of Natural Resources.?"
As I have pointed out previously,244 I believe this is a highly desir-
able enforcement system.
Unfortunately, no other state has followed this example. In-
stead, three basic organizations have been employed: (1) the exec-
utive department, or a division thereof; (2) a part-time board of
citizens, executive department representatives, and/or interest rep-
resentatives, employing an executive secretary and staff; and (3) an
executive department in conjunction with a part-time board or
health officials. In addition, an applicant may choose to attempt to avoid a hearing by pub-
lishing notice in newspapers and submitting a list of people he expects will be affected to
the state agency; if neither a member of the public nor an official of the state agency com-
plains, no hearing is necessary. Id.
See text at notes 184-192 supra.
131 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 25-54i (West Supp. 1980). Cf. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,
§ 1263(b) (1973) (requiring agency to give notice and "opportunity" for hearing or written
comments before deciding).
M This stringent requirement is particularly surprising in light of the state's air stat-
ute, which makes no provision for holding hearings in relation to permits for the construc-
tion or modification of a pollution source, see CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-519a (West 1977),
and even as to variances, requires hearings only before an application may be granted, id.
§ 19-519. In either case, for an applicant who has been denied a permit, the only statutory
means of relief is to appeal to the courts. Id. § 19-918 (West Supp. 1980).
11 E.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 46.03.160(c) (1977); IND. CODE ANN. § 13-7-10-4 (Burns Supp.
1980); MoNT. REv. CODES ANN. § 75-5-403 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-2-7(K), (L) (1979).
141 See text and notes at notes 188-189 supra.
13 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 1111/, If 1004-1006.1 (1979).
24 See Currie, Enforcement, supra note 1, at 444-49.
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commission.
A. The Executive Department
Many states have chosen to place one or more of their pollu-
tion control programs under the sole administration of an execu-
tive department.24 Alaska, for example, has a separate executive
department, headed by a commissioner of environmental conserva-
tion, that administers a coordinated program for controlling pollu-
tion of water, land, air, and other resources.2 46 The powers of the
Alaska department are comprehensive. It has "responsibility for
coordination and development of policies, programs and planning,"
and for both "promulgation and enforcement of regulations setting
standards for the prevention .. .of pollution. '247 Although one
avenue of enforcement is to seek injunctions or civil or criminal
penalties in the courts, 48 the statute also authorizes the depart-
ment itself to issue "compliance orders" to violators.24 9 Thus the
department combines the executive function of prosecution, the
legislative function of rulemaking, and the judicial function of
adjudication.
The great advantages of such a unified structure are profes-
sionalism and efficiency. No responsibility is given to part-time
amateurs; there are no multiple staffs duplicating each other's
work. The great disadvantage is the loss of the important protec-
tions against abuse of authority found in the typical constitutional
separation of powers. The most disturbing consequence is that
under such statutes the same agency that prosecutes a charge de-
termines whether it has proved its own case.
Thus in Alaska a person to whom a notice of violation and a
subsequent compliance order has been issued by the "department"
is entitled to a hearing before the same body; after the hearing, it
245 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-505 to -520a (West 1977 & Supp. 1980); id.
§§ 22a-2 to -10, 25-54a to -54xx (West 1975 & Supp. 1980) (air and water pollution control
programs administered by commissioner of environmental protection. It should be noted
that Connecticut does provide for the creation of an independent board, but its duties are
purely advisory and it has no real control over the state's pollution control efforts. See id.
§§ 22a-11 to -13 (West 1975 & Supp. 1980).); OHio Rav. CODE. ANN. §§ 3704.01-.09 (Page
1980); id. §§ 6111.01-.99 (Page 1977 & Supp. 1980) (air and water programs under a director
of environmental protection).
24" See generally ALAsKA STAT. §§ 44.46.010-.020 (1976); id. §§ 46.03.010-.35.210 (1977
& Supp. 1979).
247 Id. § 44.46.020(1)-(2) (1976).
248 Id. §§ 46.03.760, .765, .790 (1977).
-" Id. § 46.03.850.
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is the same "department" that determines whether or not to re-
scind the initial order.2 50 Under the Alaska Administrative Proce-
dure Act 251 the hearing is conducted by a "qualified, unbiased, and
impartial hearing officer,"2 5' but this requirement falls consider-
ably short of a meaningful separation of prosecutorial and judicial
functions. The hearing officer himself, despite the comforting
terms "unbiased" and "impartial," is assigned by the Governor, '
who is also ultimately responsible for prosecution. The hearing of-
ficer "may perform other duties," apparently even within the
agency,254 and there is no prohibition on his working with the
prosecutorial staff. The agency itself may hear the case "with the
hearing officer," and if it does it may retain all authority over the
hearing except to "rule on the admission and exclusion of evi-
dence. 2 5 5 While the hearing officer is required to prepare a "pro-
posed decision" if he hears the case alone, and to be present at any
deliberations concerning a case he heard with the agency, the de-
partment need not give his findings any deference whatever in
making the ultimate decision.25 6 Thus the commissioner is prosecu-
tor and judge in the same case. If this is not considered a depriva-
tion of property without due process, 2 57 it should be; and it ought
to be changed as a matter of policy.
The Alaska statute also calls for an environmental advisory
board.258 These advisory boards commonly are created by states in
which the administration of the control program is vested solely in
an executive department, 59 although they are also present in other
types of administration.2 6 0 The Alaska board consists of the com-
missioner of environmental conservation, serving as chairman, and
eight members, not officers or employees of any state agency, serv-
150 Id.
1 Id. § 44.62.010-.650 (1976 & Supp. 1979), made applicable by id. § 46.03.880 (1977).
252 Id. § 44.62.350 (1976).
3 Id.
54 Id.
:55 Id. § 44.62.450.
"Id. § 44.62.500.
26" Compare In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955) (combination of judicial and grand
jury functions constituted violation of due process) and In re Schlesinger, 404 Pa. 584, 172
A.2d 835 (1961) (disbarment hearings where court's Committee on Offenses acted as prose-
cutor, judge, and jury constituted violation of due process) with Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S.
35 (1975) (combining investigative and adjudicative functions in licensing body did not con-
stitute violation of due process) (semble).
:58 ALAsKA STAT. §§ 44.46.030-.050 (1976).
"' See, e.g., the Connecticut statutes discussed in note 245 supra.
.0 See, e.g., VA. CODE §§ 10-17.9:1-.30:1 (1978 & Supp. 1980).
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ing at the pleasure of the Governor.2 6 1 They receive a modest per
diem allowance and expenses.2 62 The board's duties are to "advise
the commissioner," "serve as a forum" for debate on the environ-
ment, recommend outstanding environmentalists for recognition
by the state, and "perform such other functions as may be re-
quested by the commissioner. ' 263 Although this board could be
made a significant source of valuable advice if the department so
chose, it seems more likely that its principal function will be main-
taining good public relations.
B. Nonadvisory Board with Executive Secretary
Virginia vests all powers of air pollution control in a five-mem-
ber Air Pollution Control Board,' whose members are to be se-
lected "for their ability," "without regard to political affiliation,"
and who may not be "officer[s] or representative[s] of any indus-
try, county, city or town which may become subject to the rules
and regulations of the Board. '265 Members receive "fifty dollars
per day, plus reasonable and necessary expenses, for each day or
portion thereof in which the member is engaged in the business" of
the Board. 26 They are required to meet "at least every three
months.26 7
This Board is given the authority to adopt regulations, to
grant variances, to investigate violations, to "initiate and receive
complaints," to "enter orders for the purpose of enforcement of its
rules or regulations," and to institute court enforcement proceed-ings.268 It is also authorized to hire a staff and appoint a full-time
"executive director," who "shall exercise such authority to admin-
ister and enforce the provisions of this chapter and rules, regula-
tions and orders of the Board as is conferred upon him by the
t ALASKA STAT. § 44.46.030 (1976). The members are appointed to staggered terms. Id.
2 Id. § 44.46.040.
2 Id. § 44.46.050.
'" VA. CODE §§ 10-17.9:1-.30:1 (1978 & Supp. 1980).
26 Id. § 10-17.12 (Supp. 1980).
Id. §§ 2.1-20.3-.4 (Supp. 1980). Board members are appointed for staggered four-
year terms by the Governor and must be confirmed by the legislature. Id. § 10-17.11 (1978).
It is worth noting the contrast with the Alaska appointment process, see text and note at
note 261 supra. The Virginia Board's greater powers apparently led the legislature to retain
more control over and leave the Governor less discretion in the appointment of board
members.
"' VA. CODE § 10-17.15 (1978).
2" Id. § 10-17.18 (Supp. 1980).
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Board.,,269
The appointment of a citizen board appears to be an effort to
broaden the base of decision making and to avoid the dangers of
bureaucratic stagnation. But pollution control is not a task that
can be performed intelligently by essentially unpaid amateurs
meeting four times a year. The Virginia scheme seems to ensure
that those charged with the ultimate administrative authority over
pollution control will not have the foggiest notion of what they are
doing.
Moreover, this structure fails to provide a meaningful separa-
tion of prosecutor and judge. Nothing in the statute ensures that
the Director is to prosecute and the Board is to decide. The statute
allows the Board to delegate to him both functions or neither. Pre-
sumably the Board might itself create an ostensible separation of
functions by delegating the entire prosecution task while retaining
the power of decision, but in the absence of sufficient expertise and
paid time to reach an independent decision, it seems all too likely
that the Board would still be essentially the puppet of the
Director.
Some statutes of this type limit the functions that may offi-
cially be delegated to the Director. Virginia's Water Pollution Con-
trol Board, for example, must itself promulgate regulations, revoke
certificates and permits, and issue enforcement orders.270 This
variation does little to overcome the objections rehearsed above. In
the first place the statute does not require the Board to divest it-
self of authority over the institution and control of prosecution.
Moreover, the institutional weakness of the Board strongly sug-
gests that the Director will dominate the decision making process
nominally entrusted to the Board.
In Indiana and Minnesota the board does not choose its execu-
tive director 7 1 and thus cannot control him; thus there is no fear
that he will simply be the tool of the board. Unfortunately, the
preceding discussion suggests that the real problem underlying all
these statutes is the reverse; making the director independent does
::" Id. § 10-17.14 (1978).
2 Id. § 62.1-44.14 (1973). The California water pollution statute is similar. CAL. WATER
CODE § 13223 (West 1971).
171 IND. CODE ANN. § 13-1-1-3 (Burns 1973) (technical secretary of air pollution control
board named by secretary of state board of health); id. § 13-1-3-3 (technical secretary of
stream pollution control board named by secretary of state board of health); id. § 13-7-2-2
(technical secretary of environmental management board designated ex officio by statute);
MN. STAT. ANN. § 116.03(i)(a) (West Supp. 1979) (director appointed by Governor).
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nothing to reduce the dependence of the nominally sovereign
board upon him.
C. The Executive Department and Nonadvisory Board
In contrast to the provisions just discussed, in which in theory
the executive director is the agent of an all-powerful board, the
more common pattern is to divide authority for pollution control
between an executive department and an independent board.
Idaho, for example, has vested all rulemaking and adjudica-
tory powers in the Board of Health and Welfare, composed of
seven members who serve four-year terms and are removable only
for cause.27 2 Executive powers, on the other hand, including the
authority to prosecute complaints before the Board, are entrusted
to the Director of the Department of Health and Welfare, who
serves at the Governor's pleasure.73
Thus the Idaho statute carefully separates the prosecutor from
the judge as a matter of theory. Yet a closer look at the Idaho
provisions raises serious doubts whether the ostensible separation
can actually be maintained in practice. The Idaho Board, like the
Virginia boards, is made up of part-time volunteers: its members
are to receive minimal per diem compensation and expenses when
"in the actual performance of duties. 2 7 4 Members who are not
paid to study the cases they are supposed to decide can hardly be
expected to render an informed, independent judgment.
The Idaho pattern is followed in several other states, but the
variations are considerable. In Wyoming, for example, the Depart-
ment of Environmental Quality issues permits, grants variances,
and utters cease-and-desist orders; divisional administrators are to
recommend regulations to its director. Yet the "independent"
Environmental Quality Council has the power to review depart-
ment actions on permits, variances, and cease-and-desist orders,
and the statute's repeated use of the phrase "the council finds"
suggests that it is not bound to give any deference to the Depart-
ment's findings.27 6 Moreover, no regulation becomes law without
272 IDAHO CODE § 39-107(1)-(2) (Supp. 1979).
27. Id. § 39-104 (1977).
27 Members receive $50 a day and travel expenses. Id. §§ 39-107(3), 59-509(h) (Supp.
1980).
27 Wyo. STAT. §§ 35-11-104 to -110 (1977).
-6 Id. §§ 35-11-111 to -112, -601, -701, -801, -802.
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Council approval.27 7 In short, the Council has ultimate rulemaking
and adjudicating authority, just as in Idaho; but as in Idaho, Coun-
cil members receive only a trivial per diem allowance and ex-
penses,2 78 so its independence may be largely imaginary.
In Oregon a five-member commission adopts regulations,
grants variances, and holds hearings to determine the imposition of
civil penalties, 79 while an "executive-administrative" Department
of Environmental Quality is directed to "seek enforcement. 2 0
Again the Commission is essentially unpaid, receiving $30 per day
of actual work plus expenses; 8 1 it would be surprising if such a
body could hold its own. Moreover, even the nominal separation of
functions in Oregon leaves much to be desired. For one thing, the
Department is empowered to "commence enforcement proceed-
ings " 8 under the state Administrative Procedure Act,"8 which
does not require so much as an independent hearing examiner, and
to render a decision upon its own complaint.284 For another, the
Commission appoints and removes the Director of the Department
at pleasure;28 5 it has power "to establish the policies for the opera-
tion of the department;" and in everything it does the Depart-
ment is "[s]ubject to policy direction by the commission. '287 De-
spite the statutory terminology, the differences between Oregon's
system and the executive-director programs discussed in the pre-
ceding section are slim indeed.
In other states the role of the board or commission is more
attenuated. In Delaware the secretary of an executive department
adopts regulations, prosecutes and rules upon complaints, and
grants permits and variances."8 The sole function of the board
(which is paid only expenses289) is to entertain appeals by persons
"substantially affected by an action of the secretary. 2 ' The stat-
17 Id. § 35-11-112(c).
28 Id. § 25-11-111(e).
27 OR. REv. STAT. §§ 468.010-.997 (1979).
280 Id. §§ 468.030, 468.035.
281 Id. §§ 292.495, 468.010(3).
282 Id. § 468.090.
- Id. §§ 183.310-.500.
2- Id. § 183.464.
2- Id. § 468.040.
286 Id. § 468.015.
287 Id. § 468.035.
2" DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 6002-6008, 6010-6012 (1975).
"I Id. § 6007(e).
8 Id. § 6008(a).
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ute does not answer the crucial question whether the board's re-
view is to be de novo. De novo review by an effective independent
board would substantially ameliorate the initial combination of
prosecutor and judge in the secretary, but even if the Delaware
board is not expected to defer to any reasonable findings by the
secretary, its part-time and poorly compensated nature seems
likely to render it less than effective.
In Vermont there is not even a pretense of separating prosec-
tor from judge. The secretary of the executive agency has nearly all
the functions of his Delaware counterpart,2 1 and the five-member
board of amateurs29 2 has only the power to grant variances. 298
D. Board Member Qualifications
The Idaho statute is very general in prescribing the qualifica-
tions of Board members. They are to be "chosen with due regard
to their knowledge and interest in environmental protection and
health," and no more than four of the seven may be of the same
political party.294 Many statutes are much more specific. It is com-
mon, for example, to require that one member be a physician, or
an engineer, or an attorney.9 5 Each of these disciplines obviously
has something to contribute to the work of the board-the doctor
understands some of the effects of pollution, the engineer some-
thing about control devices, the lawyer something about the legal
rules. Just as obviously, however, people with other professions,
such as ichthyology, or interested citizens with no expertise at all,
may have something to contribute; the urge to require particular
skills risks disqualifying the candidate for a particular vacancy who
has the most to offer. The limit on the number of members from
one political party, while an understandable precaution against
cronyism, is subject to the same criticism.
Professional and political requirements are not the only types
21 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 554 (1973).
112 Id. § 553(b) (Supp. 1980). The board is to be composed of a lawyer, a manufacturer,
an engineer, a businessman, and a member of the general public, none of whom may be
employed by the state in any other capacity.
29 Id. § 561 (1973).
294 IDAHO CODE § 39-107(1) (Supp. 1980).
29" E.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3745.02 (Page Supp. 1980) ("Each member shall have
extensive experience in pollution control and abatement technology, ecology, public health,
environmental law, economics of natural resource development, or related fields. At least
one shall be an attorney."); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 553(b) (Supp. 1980) (board must in-
clude lawyer, manufacturer, engineer, businessman, and representative of public).
[48:27
State Pollution Statutes
of qualifications imposed on board membership. Arizona's Water
Quality Control Council, for example, is composed partly of the
following people or their delegates: the director of the department
of health services; members of the state game and fish, oil and gas
conservation, and water commissions; the state land commissioner;
and the dean of the state university agricultural college.2 96 In addi-
tion, the Governor is to appoint seven members, at least one of
whom must come from each congressional district and:
one shall be appointed from the utility industry, one from the
livestock industry, one from the forest products industry, one
from the mining industry, one shall be appointed to represent
the league of cities and towns and two shall be appointed
from irrigation districts or water user associations. At least
one of the foregoing shall be a civil engineer registered in
Arizona. 9 7
Two distinct principles of selection are exemplified by the Ari-
zona statute. The first is the presence of officials of various execu-
tive branch agencies. New Mexico has carried this idea even fur-
ther; its Water Quality Control Commission is made up almost
entirely of executive officials. 9 One evident goal of this approach
is to facilitate coordination of executive policy on environmental
matters by creating what is in effect a subcabinet to dispose of
them. Another advantage is that ex officio members can devote
substantial time to their pollution control tasks at government ex-
pense, which makes for a stronger board. The major disadvantage
is that dominance of the executive in an adjudicatory body effec-
tively undermines the separation of prosecutor from judge that was
the primary apparent virtue justifying a separate board. Even
when executive members are in a minority, as in Arizona, the sepa-
ration is inadequate to satisfy ordinary notions of fair play: we do
not put the United States Attorney on a panel of the Court of
Appeals.
The second principle of selection found in the Arizona law is
that the board should be broadly representative of the interest
"' ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-1853 (1974).
2" Id. § 36-1853(7).
" N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-6-3 (1979) (commission consists of representatives of the envi-
ronmental improvement division of the health and environment department, the game and
fish department, the state engineer, the state park and recreation commission, the agricul-
ture department, the natural resources conservation commission, the bureau of mines, the
state engineer's office, and a lone representative of the public).
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groups affected by the pollution control program. Not only are
specified polluting groups, from utilities to farmers to municipal
governments, entitled to a voice, but many of the state government
members also seem likely to view their role as that of spokesman
for assorted interests their parent agencies represent. Representa-
tive government is a concept most Americans believe in, and big
corporations may be able to finance released time to permit mean-
ingful member participation. A glance at the Arizona list, however,
gives cause for concern that the council may not come anywhere
near reflecting the composition of the affected population. To state
the matter more baldly, Arizona has placed the pollution control
program in the hands of the polluters.
Other states have attempted to create more balanced combi-
nations. In Tennessee, for example, three government representa-
tives-one representative of the "public-at-large," one representa-
tive of conservation interests, one municipal representative, and
one industrial representative-comprise the water quality control
board.29  "No member shall be appointed unless at the time of his
appointment he or his employer is in compliance with the provi-
sions of [the Water Quality Control Act] as certified by the com-
missioner"; °° and only "[t]hose members of the board who do not
receive, or during the previous two (2) years have not received a
significant portion of their income directly or indirectly from per-
mit holders or applicants for a permit shall constitute a permit
hearing panel."30 1
Nevertheless, the danger remains that no board with a mem-
bership small enough to be able to function as a coherent adminis-
trative body is likely to contain representatives of every affected
interest. More fundamentally, the effort to create a representative
agency seems contrary to one of the basic reasons legislatures dele-
gate rulemaking power to begin with-the desire for decision mak-
ing based not on political power but on an objective search for the
public good. If pollution standards are to be set on a representative
basis, they should be set by a truly representative body: the elected
state legislature.
The Pennsylvania Environmental Quality Board, which has
rulemaking powers, has an unusual membership component. It
consists of twelve ex officio members, five members of the citizens'
2" TENN. CODE ANN. § 70-327(a) (Supp. 1979).
300 Id.
301 Id. § 70-327(b).
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advisory council, and four members of the General Assembly.30 2
The addition of legislators seems superficially attractive as a
means of legislative control over the essentially legislative business
of rulemaking. But if constitutional provisions for separation of
powers retain any meaning, it must give pause that executive and
legislative officials share the responsibility for a single task under
this system.
E. State, Local, and Regional Authority
Most state pollution control programs today are statewide in
effect. Many of the relevant statutes make no mention of local
powers;303 most of the others specifically permit local ordinances to
be enacted as long as they are not inconsistent with the state
program.30
In rare instances, "consistency" requires a perfect match, as in
West Virginia, where the Attorney General ruled that local ordi-
nances must be neither more nor less strict than state regula-
tions.30 5 This requirement allows local governments to participate
in enforcement, but it denies them all ability to set standards to
protect their inhabitants. Connecticut's provision is more typical:
local ordinances are permissible if no less strict than state law. 08
Some states take an intermediate position, reflecting the potential
conflict between legitimate local interests and overall state needs.
In Virginia, for example, local ordinances are subject to approval
by the state authority;3 0 7 in Florida the state administration may
preempt control over certain sources.308 Thus local desire for
stricter control may normally be accommodated, but parochial
interests will not be allowed to prevent the location of necessary
waste-disposal facilities everywhere in the State.
A few states still leave certain pollution matters largely or en-
tirely to local governments. In New Mexico, for instance, the stat-
ute requires local governments in "A class counties" to establish
801 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 180-1 (Purdon Supp. 1980).
3 See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 224.005-.520 (1977 & Supp. 1978); MISS. CODE ANN.
§§ 49-17-1 to -43 (1973 & Supp. 1979); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1251-1283 (1973 & Supp.
1980) (water program).
304 E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-7-128 (Supp. 1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 53-3426 (Supp.
1979); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-24-17 (1976).
:05 Opinion of Mar. 30, 1972, reprinted in W. VA. CODE § 16-20-5 app. (1979).
so CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-520a (West 1977).
'o, VA. CODE § 10-17.30 (1978).
£08 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 430.182 (West 1973 & Supp. 1980).
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programs to enforce the state statute by means of ordinances re-
quired to be at least as strict as state regulations. State jurisdiction
does not extend to areas that have complied with this directive,
except in case of "any act or failure to act" by the local govern-
ment itself. If a local government fails to prosecute a violator, the
state agency clearly can prosecute the local government itself for
its inaction; whether the state may also proceed directly against
the violator, which would have the advantage of curing the viola-
tion, is not clear from the words of the statute.30 9
Arizona appears to leave even more to local control. A state air
pollution board and department are to exercise "jurisdiction and
control" over "major sources," publicly owned sources, motor vehi-
cles, and other "portable" sources.3 10 Everything else is within the
ken of county or multi-county regions subject to local control; but
their regulations may not be less stringent than comparable state
requirements. 11 A further provision authorizes the state to take
over the functions of the local districts, but without specifying the
grounds on which such action may be taken. 12 Apparently this
permits the state to negate the flat statutory insistence that, ex-
cept for the specified sources, "jurisdiction and control of air pollu-
tion shall be by the county or multi-county air quality control
region."' 13
A few states create their own institutions to handle pollution
control on a local basis, rather than entrusting that function to lo-
cal government. The most intricate plan of this sort is found in
California. Simply put, the California air pollution control program
is overseen by a state board that adopts air quality standards for
each region and serves as a backup enforcement mechanism. Re-
gions are designated, largely by statute, as control districts, and
district boards are appointed in a multitude of ways by local offi-
cials. If more than one district is located in a single air basin, a
basin-wide council with rulemaking power is created. The state
board has no financial control over districts, because funds are
raised through additions to local property taxes.3 14 California's
309 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-2-4 (1979).
310 ARIZ. RIv. STAT. ANN. § 36-1706(A) (1974).
31 Id. § 36-779.
M' Id. § 36-1706(B).
313 Id.
314 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 39000-39108, 40000-40865 (West 1979 & Supp.
1980).
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water pollution control program operates in much the same way.3 15
Regionalization is evidently an attempt to preserve local au-
tonomy and to allow for varying local needs. Its costs include the
multiplication of bureaucracies, the dispersion of qualified person-
nel, and the risk of abdication of state responsibility for protecting
the public.
CONCLUSION
The details of the pollution laws vary greatly from state to
state; no uniform statute has found widespread favor in this field.
Yet the fundamentals of the program are strikingly similar nearly
everywhere. The basic pattern is to delegate broad rulemaking
power to an administrative agency, with enforcement through
administrative permits and orders, injunctions, and judicial or ad-
ministrative penalties, and commonly with the safety valve of ad-
ministrative variances for cases of special hardship.
Some of the deviations from this pattern appear to limit sig-
nificantly the effectiveness or appropriateness of the program.
Some states are too grudging in their delegations of rulemaking au-
thority; some lack a formal mechanism for dealing with hardship
cases or an adequate permit system; some provide penalties too
small to deter. In general, however, the statutory authority is basi-
cally sufficient; whether a state's control efforts are satisfactory is
essentially within the control of the administering agency. Perhaps
the most disturbing aspect of most state programs is the lack of
effective separation between prosecutor and judge, which in my
opinion is only glossed over, not corrected, by the vesting of adju-
dicatory powers in an unpaid citizen board.
3,, CAL. WATER CODE §§ 13000-13389 (West 1971 & Supp. 1980).
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